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ABSTRACT
The permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) will come into operation
after the 60th ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court of 1998. The ICC will have jurisdiction over the most serious
international crimes, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against
humanity. The focus of this thesis is the difficulties surrounding the
admissibility of a case before the ICC. There are basically two legs to this
analysis: jurisdiction and complementarity ..
Jurisdiction of the ICC is analysed in historical and theoretical context.
This comprises an overview of the international tribunals since the First World
War, and more specifically their impact on the development of jurisdiction in
international criminal law. Secondly, the thesis is examining the jurisdiction of
the ICC in terms of the specific provisions of the Rome Statute. This analysis
comprises a detailed analysis of all the provisions of the Rome Statute that
have an impact on the exercise of the ICC's jurisdiction.
The relationship between the ICC and national courts is a difficult
relationship based on a compromise at the Rome Conference in 1998. The
principle underlying this relationship is known as "complementarity". This :
means that the ICC will only exercise its jurisdiction if a national court is
"unwilling" or "unable" to exercise its jurisdiction. A detailed analysis of the
different provisions of the Rome Statute, as well as some references to other
international tribunals, serve to analyse the impact of complementarity on the
eventual ambit of the ICC's jurisdiction.
In conclusion, some suggestions regarding the admissibility of cases
and the difficult relationship between the ICC and national courts are made.
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OPSOMMING
Die permanente Internasionale Strafhof (ISH) sal met sy werksaamhede
begin na die 60ste ratifikasie van die Statuut van Rome van 1998. Die ISH sal
jurisdiksie uitoefen oor die ernstigste internasionale misdade, tewete
oorlogsmisdade, volksmoord en misdade teen die mensdom. Hierdie tesis
fokus op die probleme rondom die toelaatbaarheid van 'n saak voor die ISH.
Hierdie ontleding het basies twee bene: jurisdiksie en komplementariteit.
Die jurisdiksie van die ISH word in historiese en teoretiese konteks
ontleed. Dit behels 'n oorsig van die internasionale tribunale sedert die Eerste
Wêreldoorlog, en meer spesifiek die impak wat hierdie tribunale op die
ontwikkeling van jurisdiksie in die internasionale strafreg gehad het. In die
tweede plek word jurisdiksie ontleed aan die hand van die spesifieke
bepalings van die Statuut van Rome. Hierdie ontleding behels 'n
gedetaileerde ontleding van al die bepalings van die Statuut van Rome wat 'n
impak het op die uitoefening van die ISH se jurisdiksie.
Die verhouding tussen die ISH en nasionale howe is 'n komplekse
verhouding, gebaseer op 'n kompromie wat by die Rome Konferensie van
1998 aangegaan is. Die beginselonderliggend aan hierdie verhouding staan
bekend as "komplementariteit". Dit beteken dat die ISH slegs sy jurisdiksie sal
uitoefen indien 'n nasionale hof "onwillig" of "nie in staat is" om jurisdiksie uit
te oefen nie. 'n Gedetaileerde ontleding van die verskillende bepalings van die
Statuut van Rome, sowel as verwysings na ander internasionale tribunale,
dien om die impak van komplementariteit op die omvang van die ISH se
jurisdiksie, te ontleed.
Ten slotte word sekere voorstelle aangaande die toelaatbaarheid van
sake en die verhouding tussen die ISH en nasionale howe gemaak.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
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Introduction
In December 1997 the General Assembly decided to convene the
United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, to be held in Rome,
Italy, from June 15 to July 17, 1998, to finalise and adopt a text of
agreement for the establishment of a permanent international criminal
court.' With the adoption of the Statute of Rome on 17 July 1998 by
an overwhelming majority of the participating states", international
criminal law was launched into a new era.
Although the establishment of a permanent international criminal
court had seemed to be an impossible task over the years, it was,
considering the increasing pressure of international globalisation, just
a question of time before the International Criminal Court, based on
the Statute of Rome, was created. The tendency towards centralism
and the closely interlinked international relationships forced nations
increasingly to reorganise international criminal law - to establish a
point of orientation on an international level in terms of which states
could measure their actions. Besides, it became clear that war as
means of solving political conflicts is inefficient and engenders even
more discord between the opposing states. The establishment of the
International Criminal Court emphasises that 'peace through law' is
the only solution for a new world order and gives hope that the most
serious crimes of international concern no longer will remain
unpunishable. During the negotiations in Rome one of the most
controversial issues was the question of the sovereignty of states and
to what extent the International Criminal Court would interfere in
1 See: General Assembly Resolution 160/52 entitled Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, United Nations General Assembly Official
Records, Fifty-second Session, Supplement No. 32 A/52132 (1997)
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national concerns. However, it must be borne in mind that the real
'sovereign' in international criminal law is the individual human being
and his/her protection should be the only pertinent question. In terms
of Paragraph 2 to 4 of the Preamble of the Statute of Rome3 the
International Criminal Court was established,
"[M]indful that during this centurymillions of children,women
and men have been victims of unimaginable atrocities that
deeplyshock the conscienceof humanity,
Recognizing that such grave crimes threaten the peace,
securityandwell-beingof theworld,
Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the
internationalcommunityas a whole must not go unpunished,
and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by
taking measures at the national level and by enhancing
internationalcooperation,".
The question as to whether these ideals emphasised in the Preamble
will and can be fulfilled depends strongly on the measures that the
United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries gave the
International Criminal Court to implement the principles of the
Preamble. Central to the ability of the Court to ensure that the basic
concerns of the Preamble are addressed are the questions as to the
circumstances under which the Court may exercise its jurisdiction and
the issues of the admissibility of a case before the International
Criminal Court. These issues combined with the 'Principle of
Complementarity' will be the focus of the research.
2 120 votes in favour, 7 against and 21 abstentions
3 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) reprinted in van
den Wyngaert International Criminal Law A Collection of International and
European Instruments 2 ed (2000) 139-197
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The research is divided in three chapters, a conclusion and an
appendix. The first chapter can be seen as a part of the introduction
as it gives the necessary background information. The following two
chapters are closely related to each other as jurisdiction, the principle
of complementarity and the admissibility of a case according to the
Statute of Rome cannot be discussed separately.
The first chapter is subdivided into two main parts: a historical and a
theoretical part. The first part gives a rough overview of the history of
the International Criminal Court's establishment. This is presented
chronologically as far as possible. The history of the International
Criminal Court is practically the history of international criminal law,
therefore only sweeping historical events are highlighted for
consideration. As a certain amount of theoretical background
information is necessary to understand the context of the International
Criminal Court's jurisdiction and related issues, the second part of the
chapter deals with general jurisdictional principles in the field of
international criminal law. Besides the jurisdiction, the two ad hoc
Tribunals and the Military Tribunal of Nuremberg will be examined as
comparisons to the International Criminal Court will be made
throughout the research.
The focus of the second chapter will be on the jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court as it is based on the Rome Statute. The
structure of this chapter on the different jurisdictional issues is based,
as far as possible, on the sequence required to bring a case before
the International Criminal Court. The problems and conflicts are
discussed under each point and possible solutions are brought to
light. However, one has to keep in mind that the International Criminal
Court has not started its work yet. As the Statute of Rome is strongly
influenced by Anglo-American law with its case law system, the given
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solutions are just prognoses as to how the Court may decide on the
different issues. A main point under this chapter will be the jurisdiction
of the Court over the nationals of a Non-party state and how this
jurisdiction can be justified by means of international criminal law.
The third chapter focuses on the admissibility of a case before the
International Criminal Court. As this issue is closely related to the
principle of complementarity, the relationship with national courts will
be the topic of consideration and the difference between the ad hoc
Tribunals and the International Criminal Court will be exposed. The
chapter is divided into three main parts. The first deals with the
provisions of Article 17 where the different preconditions of
admissibility will be discussed. The question of a fitting definition
according to the different preconditions of Article 17 will also be
broached. Moreover, the principle of ne bis in idem as a special
aspect of admissibility will be emphasised. Secondly, the preliminary
rulings regarding admissibility as they are spelled out in Article 18 will
be considered. The position of the examination of Article 18 in the
research is justified by the fact that it is not clear if Article 18
represents a necessary obligation for a state before initiating a
challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court or admissibility of a case
under Article 19. Finally, the right of challenges to the jurisdiction of
the court and the admissibility of a case is discussed.
In the conclusion, the main problems of the International Criminal
Court regarding the jurisdiction and the admissibility of a case are
emphasised and a critical forecast of the future work of the Court is
given. In the appendix three diagrams are added, presenting the
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, the relationship of the
Court to the national courts, and how to bring a case before the
International Criminal Court.
-4-
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Chapter One: Historical and Theoretical Background
To understand the problems and conflicts which revolve around the
exercise of jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, based on
the Statute of Rome, it becomes necessary to give an overview of its
origin and a theoretical description of jurisdiction in international
criminal law.
1Historical Overview
The establishment of an international criminal court seemed to be an
unsolvable task for the international community in the last century. It
entailed dealing with the question of sovereignty, in giving up part of a
nation's criminal jurisdiction, and was therefore always a highly
sensitive political issue. Despite the political obstacles in the way of
an international criminal court, the question of its establishment was
always present in the intergovernmental arena. Several attempts to
establish an international criminal court were made and especially the
five international investigative commissions" and the four international
criminal ad hoc tribunals" since 1919 represent the consistent will of
nations to bring war criminals to justice.
4 1. The Commission on the Responsibilities of the Authors of War and on
Enforcement of Penalties (1919); 2. The United Nations War Crimes
Commission (1943) (UNWCC); 3. The Far Eastern Commission (1946)
(FEC); 4. The Yugoslavia Commission of Experts (1992); 5. The Rwanda
Commission of Experts (1994)
5 1. The International Military Tribunal to Prosecute the Major War Criminals
of the European Theatre (1945) (IMT); 2. The International Military Tribunal
to Prosecute the Major War Criminals of the Far East (1946) (IMTEF); 3.
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1993)
(ICTFY); 4. The International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (1994) (ICTR)
-5-
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1.1 The First World War
The first real steps" towards the establishment of an international
criminal court were taken at the end of the First World War. On 25
January 1919 a Preliminary Peace Conference commenced, during
which a Commission on Responsibility of the Authors of the War and
on the Enforcement of Penalties was established by the victorious
Allies. The majority of the Commission wanted to establish an
international criminal court, which would be able to prosecute and
punish especially the high-ranking officials and the head of the State
of Germany, Kaiser Wilhelm II. The representatives of the United
States and Japan had strong reservations about the establishment of
a permanent international criminal institution which could condemn
the "criminal actions" of officials, even the head of a state, committed
during a military intervention. Finally, the Parties of the Commission
reached a compromise in Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles",
which stipulated the establishment of an ad hoc international criminal
tribunal that only prosecuted the German Kaiser "for a supreme
offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties'". In
its Articles 228 and 229 the Treaty of Versailles provided for the
prosecution of German military personnel accused of violating the
laws and customs of war before Allied Military Tribunals or before the
Military Courts of any of the Allies. Although Germany signed the
Treaty of Versailles, almost none of the perpetrators were convicted.
6 The Court of Breisach, Germany in 1474, which tried and convicted Peter
von Hagenbach for violating "the law of God and man" is often mentioned in
the literature as the first international criminal court.
7 Treaty of Versailles (excerpts) (28 June 1919), reprinted in van den
Wyngaert International Criminal Law A Col/ection of International and
European Instruments 2ed (2000) 53-53
8 Art. 227Treaty of Versailles (supra 7)
- 6-
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Kaiser Wilhelm II found refuge in the Netherlands and Germany
simply refused to hand over most of the war crlrmnals."
After the Treaty of Versailles, the next discussion on the set up of an
international criminal court took place at the League of Nations. On
13 February 1920 the Council of the League appointed an Advisory
Committee of Jurists to discuss the establishment of a permanent
Court of International Justice." The proposal for a High Court of
International Justice, as discussed by the Committee of Jurists, did
not define the crimes for which offenders would be prosecuted. This
would be left to the Court itself. The failure to define the crimes in the
proposal was seen as a violation of the principle nul/urn crimen sine
lege by several members of the Commlttee." Furthermore, the
proposal was not supported by the Legal Committee of Nations,
resulting in the closure of the discussion on an international criminal
court at an intergovernmental level.
Until 1934 the possibility of an international criminal court existed only
on an academic level. The International Law Association, for
example, explored the establishment of an international criminal court
during different conferences. Due to the assassination of King
Alexander of Yugoslavia and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Barthou, in Marseille on 9 October 1934, the question of an
international criminal court was brought back into the international
political arena. France launched an initiative in the League of Nations
to establish an International Terrorism Convention, in conjunction with
9 Von Hebel An International Criminal Court - A Historical Perspective in von
Hebel et al (eds) Reflections on the International Criminal Court (1999) 13-
16
10 Von Hebel (supra 9) 16
11 Von Hebel (supra 9) 17
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the establishment of an international criminal court, which finally also
failed due to lack of sufficient support from other nations."
1.2 The Second World War
During the Second World War already the Allied Powers discussed
the question of how to prosecute German officials for atrocities. They
finally announced their intentions in the Declaration of St. James in
1942. In stipulating the establishment of the United Nations War
Crimes Comrnlsslonl'', the Declaration of St. James was the first step
leading to the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. On 1
November 1943 Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin met in Moscow and
issued a declaration known as the Moscow Declaration to constitute
the jurisdictional basis for various later trials of the European Axis.
1.2.1 The International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg
After the capitulation of the German Reich on 8 May 1945, the Allies
finally realised the full extent of the atrocities of the Nazis and
accelerated the establishment of an International Military Tribunal.
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was a watershed
event in the progression of the International Criminal Court from the
drawing-board to concrete reality. The negotiations for an effective
Statute of an International Military Tribunal took place in London
between the 26 June and 8 August 1945. Finally the International
Military Tribunal was constituted by the Nuremberg Charter, which
12 Von Hebel (supra 9) 17
13 The UNWCC was established to investigate and obtain evidence of war
crimes.
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was an annex of an international agreement 14 known as the London
Accord and signed by the four Allied powers, namely France, the
United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of America.
The thirteen articles of the Nuremberg Charter addressed the
tribunal's composition, rules of procedure, jurisdiction and the law to
be applied. According to Article 6 of the Charter of the International
Military Tribunal, the Tribunal had jurisdiction over crimes against
peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The significant
feature of Article 6 was the inclusion of two crimes that had not
previously been articulated in international criminal law: crimes
against humanity and crimes against peace. These two new classes
of crimes made it possible to bring to justice German high officials
who might otherwise have been beyond the reach of conviction, but
whose actions so shocked the human conscience that they warranted
particular sanction.
During the sessions of the Tribunal most of the defendants' objections
dealt with the question as to whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction and
which law was to be applied. The powerful argument of the
defendants regarding the jurisdiction of the Tribunal revolved around
the question of the sovereignty of the state and whether the law could
be applied using the principle nul/urn crimen sine lege.15 To this day
the question of legitimacy is still being discussed at an academic
14 The Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War
Criminals of the European Axis (1945), Charter of the International Military
Tribunal, reprinted in van den Wyngaert International Criminal Law A
Collection of International and European Instruments 2ed (2000) 55-61
15 Sadat The Evolution of the ICC: From The Hague to Rome and Back
Again in Sewall, Karsen (eds) TheUnited States and the International
Criminal Court National Security and International Law (2000) 31-35
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level.16 However, the Nuremberg Judgment has been understood to
affirm the idea that initiating a war as a measure of solving interstate
conflict is morally, legally and politically wrong.
1.2.2 The International Military Tribunal for the Far East
In relation to the war in the Far East the idea of punishing the
perpetrators for their crimes came rather late. On 26 July 1945, two
weeks before the conclusion of the London Conference, the four
Allied powers signed the Potsdam Declaration announcing their
intention to prosecute senior Japanese officials for their war crimes.
According to this Declaration, "[s]tem justice shall be meted out to all
war criminals,,17in Japan.
The International Military Tribunal for the Far East was constituted in
the Tokyo Charter", which largely had the same character as the
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal. The International Military Tribunal
for the Far East started its work on 29 April 1946. An important
difference between Nuremberg and Tokyo was that the Tokyo
Tribunal aimed predominantly at the prosecution of perpetrators of
the crime against pesce."
16 Roggeman Die Internationalen Strafgerichtshofe EinfOhrung
Rechtsgrundlagen Dokumente Erganzungsband: Das Statut von Rom Mit
einer EinfOhrung 2ed (1998) 5-6; Jeschek Lehrbuch des Strafrechts
Allgemeiner Tei/4th (1988) 104-108
17 Roling The Tokyo Tiail and Beyond Reflections of a Peacemonger
Cassese (ed) 1-2
18 Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (1946)
reprinted in van den Wyngaert International Criminal Law A Collection of
International and European Instruments 2ed (2000) 63-67
19 Von Hebel (supra 9) 22
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To this day the Tokyo Trials have been severely criticised: the legal
categories of the crimes against peace and humanity have been
described as ex post facto legislation on the part of the London
Conference, in the sense that these crimes did not exist in
international law prior to 1945.20 Furthermore, the criticism was that
the Tokyo Trials were substantially unfair as an American answer for
the treacherous attack on Pearl Harbour."
1.3 The Period of the Cold War
After the Second World War the United Nations considered the
establishment of a permanent international criminal court in
connection with the formulation and adoption of the Genocide
Convention22 in 1946. Although the Genocide Convention was
adopted relatively quickly, efforts to create the International Criminal
Tribunal, which was stipulated in Article VI of the Genocide
Convention, failed. Indeed, the reference to an international penal
tribunal now found in Article VI of the Genocide Convention had been
deleted from earlier drafts and was restored only after extensive
debate.23 The establishment of an international criminal court was
rejected due to the fact that it would violate national sovereignty.
Besides which, it was criticised because the functioning of such an
institution could not be effective as long as no international criminal
law and international enforcement mechanisms existed.
As a resolution accompanying the adoption of the Genocide
Convention, the United Nations General Assembly invited the newly
20 ROling (supra 17) 5
21 Sadat (supra 15) 34; Roggemann (supra 16) 6
22 Convention on the Prevention and Suppression of the Crime of Genocide
(1948) reprinted in van den Wyngaert International Criminal Law A
Collection of International and European Instruments 2ed (2000) 411-412
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established International Law Commission to examine the possibility
of the establishment of an international judicial institution, which
would be able to prosecute and punish "war criminals". The
commission was deeply divided on this sublect." But a majority
concluded that the establishment of an international criminal court is
desirable and possible. By resolution 489 (V) of 12 December 1950,
the Sixth Committee appointed a special committee of experts to
prepare drafts for an International Criminal Court_25 In 1954 the
International Law Commission adopted the Draft Code of Offences
against the Peace and Security of Mankind.26 From 1954 to 1989 the
discussion on the establishment of an International Criminal Court
almost came to a halt because of foreign policy difficulties in the era
of the Cold War.
1.4 The Time from 1989 to the Foundation of the International
Criminal Court
With the decline of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the end of the Cold
War, discussions on an International Criminal Court resumed. In 1991
the International Law Commission adopted the draft Code of Crimes
against the Peace and Security of Mankind27• At the request of
Trinidad and Tobago in 1989 the question of establishing an
International Criminal Court was placed back on the political agenda
of the United Nations. The International Law Commission was asked
23 Sadat (supra 15) 36
24 Sadat (supra 15) 36; Von Hebel (supra 9) 24
25 Von Hebel (supra 9) 25
26 Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind
(excrepts) (1954) reprinted in van den Wyngaert International Criminal Law
A Collection of International and European Instruments 2ed (2000) 205-206
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by the Assembly of the United Nations to discuss the establishment of
an International Criminal Court at its next sesslon."
1.4.1 The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
During the course of 1991 the armed conflict between the republics of
Yugoslavia started. Because of the atrocities committed during the
first year of the conflict, the Security Council adopted Resolution 780
on 6 October 1992, which stipulated the establishment of a
Commission of Experts to investigate and gather evidence of
violations of the Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian
law. On 22 February 1993 the Security Council adopted Resolution
808, which stipulated the establishment of an International Criminal
Tribunal.
The Tribunal, being established by the Security Council acting under
Chapter VII, was therefore a subsidiary organ of the Security Council.
It officially came into legal existence on 25 May 1993 in The Hague
and was subsequently named the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia.29
Article 1 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yuqoslavla" stipulated that the Tribunal "shall have the power to
prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international
27 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1991)
reprinted in van den Wyngaert International Criminal Law A Col/ection of
International and European Instruments 2ed (2000) 207-214
28 Von Hebel (supra 9) 27
29 Bassiouni "From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need
to Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court" 1997 HHRJ 11-43
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humanitarian law". An obvious distinction from other ad hoc tribunals,
such as the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg or the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, is that the prosecution
was not limited to some offenders, but to all those who violated
international humanitarian law, irrespective of which side they took in
this conflict,"
1.4.2 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
In July 1994 the Security Council passed Resolution 935 establishing
a commission of experts to investigate violations of international
humanitarian law committed during the Rwanda civil war. On 8
November 1994 the Security Council created an ad hoc Tribunal
under Chapter VII.
More than half a million civilians had already lost their lives during the
civil war in Rwanda.32 The Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda33 was largely based on the Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. However,
in contrast to the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, the Statute for the Rwanda Tribunal was
predicated on the assumption that the conflict was not an
international armed conflict but a civil war. The offences against the
Geneva Conventions and violations of the laws or customs of war,
30 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1993)
reprinted van den Wyngaert International Criminal Law A Col/ection of
International and European Instruments 2ed (2000) 73-81
31 Bassiouni (supra 29) 43
32 Von Hebel (supra 9) 31
33 The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1994)
reprinted in van den Wyngaert International Criminal Law A Col/ection of
International and European Instruments 2ed (2000) 129-137
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listed in Article 2 and 3 of the Yugoslavia Statute, lacking in the
Statute for Rwanda, indicate that the Security Council considered the
armed conflict in Yugoslavia as of international scope."
Article 7 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda stipulated temporary jurisdiction beginning on the 1 January
1994 and ending on 31 December 1994. That means that only crimes
committed during that period fall under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
1.4.3 The Establishment of an International Criminal Court
After the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, the International Law Commission met in 1993 to
discuss the question of an International Criminal Court again.
Obviously the creation of the Intemational Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia had an influence on the progress of establishing
an International Criminal Court. The International Law Commission
managed to recommend a draft Statute of the International Criminal
Court to the General Assembly in 1994. The Draft Statute was the
basis upon which the General Assembly in 1994 established the Ad
Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, and then in 1995 the Preparatory Committee for the
Establishment of an International Criminal court." The Preparatory
Committee met several times from 1995 to 1997 to fulfil their mandate
of reviewing major substantive and administrative issues arising out
of the draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal.36
34 Meron "International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities" 1995 AJIL 555-
556
35 Bassiouni (supra 29) 57
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Despite the difficulty of the work of the Preparatory Committee, on 15
June 1998 the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court was opened in Rome by the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, Kofi Annan. Over five weeks the participants of the
Conference discussed the issues of the establishment of an
International Criminal Court. The most politically sensitive aspects
during the Conference were the definition of the crimes, the
jurisdictional system and the principle of complementarity."
On 18 July 1998 the Statute of the International Criminal Court was
adopted in Rome by a non-recorded vote with 120 in favour, seven
against and 21 abstentions. Thereafter it was opened for signature. In
terms of Article 126 the Rome Statute will "enter into force on the first
day of the month after the 60th day following the date of the deposit
of the 60th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession". To date 139 parties have signed and 32 parties have
ratified the Statute of Rome.38
36 Von Hebel (supra 9) 33
37 Roggemann (supra 16) 11
38 Ratification Status as
www.un.org/law/icc/statute/status.html
of 21 May 2001,
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2 Jurisdiction in the field of International Criminal Law
Jurisdiction can be defined very generally as the power of a state39 to
affect the rights of persons, whether by legislation, executive decree
or by judgment of a court." Accordingly, jurisdiction in an aspect or a
consequence of sovereignty. 41 In the simplest terms, sovereignty is
the right of a state to do within its own territory anything that it wishes
to do.42
There are three different areas matching the three branches of
government in which jurisdiction can be categorised: legislative
jurisdiction, executive jurisdiction and judicial jurisdiction. With respect
to jurisdiction in criminal law matters, legislative and judicial
jurisdiction are the main areas of consideration.
Jurisdiction in the field of international criminal law firstly refers to the
question of whether or not an act which was committed abroad, or by
a foreigner, or which has resulted in an injury to a foreign interest, is
subject to the domestic criminal power of the prosecuting state." So
far it can be said that the question of jurisdiction in international
criminal law appears if an offence with a foreign element is
concerned. Secondly, it refers to the question of whether and under
which circumstances 'international criminal tribunals and courts' can
exercise their jurisdiction (without violating the sovereignty of states).
39 As well as the powerof a legitimizedinternational institution
40 Cameron The Protective Principle of International Criminal Jurisdiction
i1994) 1-3
1 Cameron (supra 40) 3
42 MWendwa Sovereignty and International Criminal Law Volume I Crimes
and Punishment in Bassiouni INanda (eds) A Treatise on International
Criminal Law (1973) 94-94
43 Jeschek (supra 16) 145
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As to the first question, a distinction must be drawn between common
law states and civil law states. The common law states have
acknowledged only territorial jurisdiction in contrast to the civil law
states, which have various forms of extra-territorial jurlsdlction."
2.1 Jurisdiction over offences with a foreign element
As a consequence of the different legal systems", states have
developed and apply different types of rules regulating the spatial
scope of their respective criminal laws. However, these rules have a
large number of underlying similarities and therefore can be
categorised into a number of different principles. These principles are
called Principles of International Criminal Law.46
As far as criminal jurisdiction is concerned, there are basically four
variables: the place where the offence was committed, the character
of the offender, the character of the victim, and the character of the
offence. These variables can, however, be expressed in more than
four principles, and the authorities differ slightly as to how many
different principles there are and the exact scope of each of them.
According to the literature", the jurisdictional claims of states can
now be divided into eight general principles.
44 Gilbert Crimes sans Frontiers: Jurisdictional Problems in English Law in
Dugart, Wyngaert (eds) International Criminal Law and Procedure (1996)
101-102
45 The Common Law System and the Civil Law System
46 Jeschek (supra) 141
47 Eser Vorbemerkung zu den Paragraphen 3-7 (sog. Internationales
Strafrecht) in Schënke et al Strafgesetzbuch Kommentar 25th (1997) 61-64
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2.1.1 The Principle of Territoriality
The principle of territoriality is a consequence of the sovereignty of a
state over its territory. A state48 can apply the national law on all acts
committed within its boundaries Uurisdiction ratione locl) irrespective
of the nationality of the offender or victim (lurlsdlctlon ratione
personae), the offence (iurisdiction ratione materiae), or time of the
offence (iurlsdiction ratione temporis).
The principle of territoriality is the basis of the jurisdiction in criminal
law (Basis des Strafanwendungsrechts) and expresses the exclusive
sovereignty of the state within its own boundanes." Despite the fact
that the principle of territoriality seems to be very simple to apply,
unanswered questions arise where certain elements of crimes are
committed beyond the borders, or where the result of a crime is
sustained in more than one country. So far the principle of territorial
jurisdiction shows glaring weaknesses and needs to be
complemented by other prmclples." However, according to justice
and to the principle of judicial economy (Grundsatz der
Prozel3okonomie), the principle of territoriality is the most efficient
because the gathering of evidence at the scene of the crime is
expected to produce the best results.
48 State in this sense means: territory, nationals and governmental power
49 Oehler Internationales Strafrecht (1973) 151-152
50 Bemmelen Reflections and Observations on International Criminal Law in
Bassiouni , Nanda (eds) A Treatise on International Criminal Law Volume I
Crimes and Punishment (1973) 77-80
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2.1.2 The Flag Principle
Closely related to the principle of territoriality is the flag principle. This
means that all crimes committed on vessels or on aircrafts fall under
the competence of the state under which flag the vessel is travelling
or in which state the aircraft is legally registered. This is irrespective
of whether the offender is a non-national or whether the vessel or
aircraft was located in another sovereign territory at the time of the
crime."
2.1.3 The Active Personality Principle
Only nationals or domiciled people fall under the competence of the
active personality principle. Therefore, the most important issue of the
active personality principle is the nationality of the offender. According
to t,he active personality principle, national criminal law has to be
applied if a national is the offender, irrespective of in which state the
result of a crime is sustained, or where different elements of the crime
have been committed.52
Almost all European states which apply the civil law system exercise
the active personality principle jurisdiction, partly or mainly because
there are legal or even constitutional barriers53 to extraditing their own
natlonals.P' But even states which just use the principle of
51 Jeschek (supra 16) 150
52 Eser (supra 47) 64
53 For example Article 16 of the German Constitution, which was changed
on the 27 October 2000 to make the ratification of the Statute of Rome
possible. Until now the surrender of a German national to a foreign court
was prohibited under constitutional law.
54 Cameron (supra 40) 67
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territoriality, such as the United Kingdom, tend to apply the active
personality principle to people who spend a long time abroad, such as
diplomats or military personnel, because they enjoy immunity in the
locus delictus and therefore cannot be punished."
2.1.4 The Protective Principle
All states reserve the right, directly or indirectly, to prosecute persons
whose crimes damage the vital interests of a state. So far this
extraterritorial principle is concerned with offences committed beyond
the boundaries of the state, as otherwise the territorial principle would
apply and, as its name indicates, its ratio is bound up with the nature
of the interest protected." The principle is justified because the
intention of the offence against a state sets up a relationship with the
criminal law system of that state whose interests have been affected.
Therefore, the principle can be characterised in simple terms as a
'right of self defence' of the state concerned.
2.1.5 The Passive Personality Principle
The passive personality principle can be seen as a part or aspect of
the protective principle. Where to dispose the passive personality
principle depends on the range of the definition of the valid interests
of a state (in/andische Rechtsgiiter).57 It purports to give extra-
territorial jurisdiction to a state whenever one of its nationals, outside
55 Cameron (supra 40) 67
56 Feller Jurisdiction over Offenses with a Foreign Element in Bassiouni,
Nanda (eds) A Treatise on International Criminal Law Volume /I Jurisdiction
and Cooperation (1973) 5-26
57 Jeschek (supra 16) 151
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the territory of that state, is a victim of the offence. Thus, nationals are
entitled to enjoy the active protection of their states wherever they
may be and in the face of offences likely to injure them.
2.1.6 The Principle of Universality
The principle of universality means that the municipal criminal law can
also be applied to crimes committed in a foreign state by a foreigner
or a national, even though the protective, active or passive
personality principle would not be applicable.
The first widely accepted crime of universal jurisdiction was piracy.
For over three centuries states have exercised their jurisdiction over
piratical acts on the high seas, even when neither the pirates nor their
victims were nationals of the prosecuting state. Piracy's nature and
consequences explain why it was subject to universal jurisdiction.
Piracy often consists of heinous acts of violence or depredation
committed indiscriminately against the vessels and nationals of
numerous states.
In the aftermath of the atrocities of the Second World War the
international community extended universal jurisdiction to war crimes
and crimes against humanity. During the Second World War the
greater number of war criminals were tried primarily by the national
courts of the Allies rather than by the various international tribunals.
They justified their jurisdiction alongside the protective and the
passive personality principles, with the principles of universality.58
58 Meron (supra 34) 568
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However, this far-reaching jurisdiction must be limited and can only
be claimed if a criminal threat to undermine the very foundations of
the enlightened international community as a whole exists.59 It is now
widely accepted, but still the subject of much discussion and debate,
that breaches (irrespective if grave or non-grave) of the four Geneva
Conventions on the Law of Armed Conflict of 1949 and crimes
against humanity as core crimes of international criminal law, granting
universal jurisdiction.6o A state can have jurisdiction over crimes
codified in these conventions even though they were committed
outside its boundaries and the offender has no connection with the
state claiming its jurisdiction. Therefore, the principle is only based on
customary international law and conventions and represents an
important issue considering the prosecution and punishment of
persons for war crimes and crimes against humanity." This is
because the international community agrees that the core crimes
should not go unpunished.
Since the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provides
for the principle of complementarity, the primary responsibility of
prosecution of core crimes lies in the hands of the national criminal
law systems. In the case (not yet decided) of the International Court
of Justice, Congo versus Belgium, the Declaration of Judge Van den
Wyngaert according to the principle of universality was that, "[i]n the
absence of supranational enforcement mechanisms, national criminal
prosecution before domestic courts is the only means to enforce
international criminal law. States have not only a moral but also a
legal obligation under international law to ensure that they are able to
59 Jeschek (supra 16) 152
60 Meron (supra 34) 569
61 Oehler (supra 49) 501
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prosecute international core crimes domestically.,,62 This means that
states not only have the right to apply their jurisdiction over core
crimes, but even more the duty to do so.
2.1.7 The Representation Principle
The idea of this form of extraterritorial jurisdiction is that the state
asserts competence in stepping "into the shoes" with a more pressing
claim to prosecute. This may be as a result of a request from this
latter state, possibly under the European Convention on the Transfer
of Proceedings in Criminal Matters63 or as a result of a refusal to
extradite. In the second instance, the state will take over the
prosecution of the fugitive, either voluntarily or by virtue of an
obligation in some multilateral, anti-terrorist convention." The deeper
sense of the principle is that an offender cannot remain unpunished
because of a failing extradition, irrespective of its reasons. Modern
nations are interested in the punishment of offenders who were
caught in a state, but not extradited to the state that normally has
jurisdiction over them.
Drawing a line between the principle of universality and the principle
of representation can sometimes be very complicated. Even in
Articles 9 and 10 of the Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect
62 Congo v. Belgium "Order Provisional Measure - 8 December 2000"
Declaration of Judge van den Wyngaert, www.icj-
cij.org/icjwwwidocketlicobe/icobeorders/icob order dec/aration-wyngaert
2000120B.htm
63 European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters
(1972) reprinted in van den Wyngaert International Criminal Law A
Collection of International and European Instruments 2ed (2000) 1019-1030
64 Gilbert (supra 44) 109
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to Crime65, the distinction between these two principles is not clearly
emphasised. However, the distinctions are that the principle of
representation is not founded on treaties or conventions and always
retreats (steps) behind the extradition (Prinzip der Subsidiaritat).
Furthermore, the principle of universality is independent of the
question of extradition and is only based on treaties and
conventions."
2.2 Jurisdiction of International Criminal Courts
Among the post-Second World War humanitarian law instruments,
only the Genocide Conventlon'" in Article VI and the Apartheid
Convention" in Article V refer directly to an international criminal
tribunal. These instruments are the only intemational law sources
providing concurrent jurisdiction between a state and an international
body. In the absence of a permanent international criminal court,
jurisdiction over war crimes or other international crimes has been
exercised either through domestic prosecution or intemational
criminal (military) tribunals.
In question are the features of the jurisdiction of the international
military and criminal tribunals. Since there is a similarity between the
Nuremberg and the Tokyo Trials, the question of the jurisdiction of the
65 Draft Conventionon Jurisdictionwith Respect to Crime (1935) reprinted in
Mueller,Wise (eds) International Criminal Law (1965) 41-46
66 Oehler (supra 49) 501
67 Conventionon the Preventionand Suppressionof the Crime of Genocide
(1948) reprinted in van den Wyngaert International Criminal Law A
Collection of International and European Instruments 2ed (2000)411-412
68 InternationalConventionon the Supresion and Punishmentof the Crime
of Apartheid (1973) reprinted in van den Wyngaert International Criminal
Law A Collection of International and European Instruments 2ed (2000)
415-419
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International Military Tribunal for the Far East will not be discussed
further.
2.2.1 The Jurisdiction of the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg
It was mainly the domestic courts of the Allies that carried out the
prosecution and punishment of the German perpetrators. The
exercise of jurisdiction for those various trials after the Second World
War was based on the Declaration of Moscow Conference on 1
November 1943. It stipulated that:
"[T]hose German officers and men and members of the Nazi
party who have been responsible for, or have taken a
consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres and
executions, will be sent back to the countries in which their
abominable deeds were done in order that they may be
judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated
countries and of the free government which will be created
therein [...] without prejudice to the ease of the major
criminals, whose offenses have no particular geographical
loealization and who will be punished by the joint decision of
the Governments of the Allies."
The first part of the declaration constitutes the jurisdictional basis of
the Allies' domestic trials. The principle of territoriality doubtless
justifies the jurisdiction of national courts where the geographical
location of the crime committed is clear. Therefore, a further
jurisdictional basis, as can be seen in the Moscow declaration, was
actually redundant. Hence, it can be said that the first part of the
declaration was to make sure in the first place that the perpetrators
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had to be extradited to those states where they committed their
crimes.
The second part of the declaration stipulated that the war crimes that
did not fit within the traditional princlples'" of jurisdiction had to be
punished too. The intention that every perpetrator had to be
prosecuted was declared. How to exercise jurisdiction over war
crimes where the locus delicti was not clear was finally decided in the
London Accord" on 8 August, which provided through the
Nuremberg Charter" the establishment of an International Military
Tribunal.
The jurisdiction of the International Military Tribunal was constituted in
Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter, stipulating that the "Tribunal [...J
shall have the power to try and punish persons who, acting in the
interests of the European Axis countries, whether as individuals or as
members of organizations, committed any of the following crimes."
During the trials, the validity of the Charter was always in question
and thereby the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, because of the application
of ex post facto laws. The Tribunal held in its judgment that it was
bound to the Charter and that the jurisdictional basis of the
International Military Tribunal as provided in the Charter could not be
challenged.72 The reason for that, at least, was that the drawing up of
the Charter was the exercise of the sovereign legislative power by the
69 The principle of territoriality and the active personality principle
70 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis (1945) reprinted in Mueller, Wise (eds)
International Criminal Law (1965) 227-238
71 Charter of the International Military Tribunal (supra) 55-61
72 Simons The Jurisdictional Bases of the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg in Ginsburgs, Kudriavtsev (eds) The Nuremberg Trail and
International Law (1990) 39-43
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countries to which the German Reich unconditionally surrendered and
the undoubted right of these countries to legislate for the occupied
territories and therefore had been recognized by the civilized world.73
The unconditional surrender signed by the representatives of the
legitimate government of Germany may be interpreted as a transfer of
Germany's sovereignty to the victorious powers. Since the German
territory together with its population had been placed under the
sovereignty of the occupying states, the whole legislative and
executive power formerly exercised by the German government had
been taken over without any restriction by the governments of the
Allies.74
2.2.2 The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia
As mentioned above, the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia was established under Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter and therefore presents a subsidiary organ of the
Security CouncW5• The jurisdiction of such an organ is binding on all
member states of the United Nations."
73 Simons (supra 72) 43
74 Kelsen "The Legal Status of Germany according to the Declaration of
Berlin" American Journal of International Law 1945 518-524
75 In distinction to the IMT which was constituted in the London Accord
signed by the four Allied Powers.
76 The question of the legality of the creation of the Tribunal by the Security
Council is not really a jurisdictional issue. However it is obviously a
preliminary issue that conditions all aspects of jurisdiction. The legality of
the Tribunal will not further be discussed, as it is now widely accepted (cf
Prosecuter v Dusko Tadic alk/a "Dule (1995) IT-94-1-AR72)
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According to Articles 1 to 5, the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia shall have jurisdiction over grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws or customs of war,
genocide and crimes against humanity. In Article 8 the jurisdictional
power is geographically limited to the territory of the former Socialist
Republic of Yugoslavia and temporally for crimes committed after 1
January 1991.
The Tribunal shall have concurrent jurisdiction over national courts,
as Article 9 paragraph 1 provides. Recalling the principle of
universality, national courts can exercise their jurisdiction over certain
crimes in international law. This means a state can prosecute and
punish a perpetrator in such cases whenever he is arrested in its
territory.
The creation of an international tribunal raises the question of
whether its jurisdiction should be exclusive or concurrent with the
jurisdiction conferred on all states for crimes under universal
jurisdiction. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia is vested with concurrent jurisdiction. This means that the
national criminal courts can exercise their jurisdiction parallel the
Tribunal. In vesting the Tribunal with concurrent jurisdiction, the
Security Council did suppose that it could not handle all crimes within
its jurisdiction on its own and therefore recognised concurrent
jurisdiction in national courts to ensure that the Tribunal won't be
overwhelmed with cases and become paralysed through pressure of
work.77
77 Wedgwood National Courts and the Prosecution of War Crimes in
McDonald, Swaak-Goldman (eds) Substantive and Procedural Aspects of
International Criminal Law - The Expirience of International Criminal Courts
Volume I Commentary (2000) 391-401
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Article 9, para. (2), however, stipulates that the Tribunal has primary
jurisdiction over national courts, because it can at any stage of the
procedure request the national court to defer its competence. Article
9, para. (2) therefore solves the question of which jurisdiction should
prevail in the case of a conflict between a national court and the
Tribunal.
The power of the Tribunal to exercise primary jurisdiction over
national courts was used by the Tribunal to obtain jurisdiction over
Omarska camp-guard, Dusko Tadic. A prosecution was originally
brought forward in German national courts. The Tadic deferral
occurred at a time when the International Criminal Tribunal had no
other defendants in custody, and prevented that enterprise from
becoming dlsplrlted."
In the case Prosecutor versus Tadic79, the defendant's argument,
according to the primary jurisdiction of the Tribunal, was, that Article
9, para. (2) has no basis in international law because only the
domestic criminal courts can have primary jurisdiction over nationals.
The Trial Chamber's opinion was that this question refers to the
legality of the establishment of the Tribunal and therefore fell beyond
its competence.
The Appeal Chamber accepted the standing of Tadic to challenge the
jurisdiction of the court, but rejected the arguments of the accused
and favoured the primary jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The problem of
78 Wedgwood (supra 77) 403
79 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic AlK/A "Dule" (1995) IT-94-1-T and Prosecuter
v Dusko Tadic alk/a "Dule (1995) IT-94-1-AR72 reprinted in Klip, Sluiter
(eds) Annoted Leading Cases of the International Criminal Tribunals - The
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1999) 14-139
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the Tribunal's concurrent jurisdiction with the possibility to defer
national jurisdiction is that there might be encroachment on a state's
sovereignty. A violation of sovereignty in case of a Tribunal
established by the Security Council of the United Nations under
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations can, however, be
denied. The reason is that the establishment of the Tribunal was the
exercise of the sovereign legislative power by the Security Council. In
becoming a party to the United Nations the states also accepted the
legislative powers and the jurisdiction of the Security Council.
Accordingly, it can be said that, regarding decisions of the Security
Council, the members of the United Nations partly lose their claim of
sovereignty.
.
2.2.3 The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda
Under Article 7 of the Rwanda Tribunal Statute the jurisdiction of the
Rwanda Tribunal is limited to crimes committed in the territory of
Rwanda or in neighbouring states to crimes committed by nationals of
Rwanda. The restriction on the competence of the Rwanda Tribunal
is the result of its limited mandate as a subsidiary organ of the
Security Council.8o Article 7 of the Rwanda Tribunal Statute also limits
the temporal jurisdiction of the Tribunal to crimes committed between
1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has, like the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, concurrent
jurisdiction with the national courts. However, Art 8, para. (2)
stipulates that the Tribunal shall have primacy over the national
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courts in the sense that it can at any stage of the procedure request
the national court to defer its competence. Like Article 9, para. (2) of
the Statute for the Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia, this therefore
resolves the question as to which jurisdiction should prevail if a
conflict between national courts and the Tribunal should arise.
Concurrent jurisdiction and the right of primacy in the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda have led to anomalies arguably
inconsistent with an equal standard of justice, because of the
differences in punishment available in the international and national
courts. The maximum possible sentence of the Rwanda Tribunal is
life imprisonment. Rwandan national Courts can impose a death
penalty and have done so after abbreviated trials lacking defence
council."
8°Morris,Scharf The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 291
81 Wedgwood (supra 77)403
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Chapter Two: The Jurisdiction of the International
CriminalCourt
The establishment of an International Criminal Court, as decided on
17 July 1998 by the Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries, is
obviously a great step towards attaining justice in international law.
However, recalling the fact that establishing a permanent
International Criminal Court also entails possible criminal
responsibility for officials of a state - even for the head of a state - and
therefore presents a highly sensitive political area, the realisation of
justice through an International Criminal Court must be awaited in
critical anticipation. The euphoria about an International Criminal
Court is understandable, but the issue of whether the Court will ever
be able to fulfil its tasks efficiently raises questions of jurisdiction'",
complementarity and the admissibility of a case. Although these three
features are discrete, they are intimately related to each other
according to the Rome Statute and therefore must be partly
discussed together.
Articles 1 and 11 to 19 of the Rome Statute form the jurisdictional
backbone of the court and present the main obstacles that have to
overcome before a situation can be considered as an admissible case
before the International Criminal Court.
Article 1 of the Rome Statute summarises a common set of principles
on issues of the Court's jurisdiction. The first part of Article 1 of the
82 Jurisdiction under the Statute must be understood in its broad meaning. It
includes not only the Competence of the Chambers of the Court, but also
the competence of the prosecutor to initiate an investigation, whether a
complaint is referred by a State or initiated by the Prosecutor.
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Rome Statute stipulates that the Court can only exercise its
jurisdiction over natural persons and further limits the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. The Court "shall have
power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons (only) for the most
serious crimes of international concern". These crimes are spelled out
in Article 5 and defined in Articles 6, 7 and 8. The second part of
Article 1 emphasises the relationship to the national criminal
jurisdiction, as it shall be complementary.
1 Ratification of the Statute
The first precondition for the exercise of the International Criminal
Court's jurisdiction is that the Statute of Rome enters into force. As
Article 126, para. (1) stipulates, the Statute will enter into force on the
first day of the month after the sixtieth day following the date of the
deposit of the sixtieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval
or accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. After
the Statute has entered into force, it will bind states that still want to
become parties pursuant to Article 126, para. (2), on the first day of
the month after the sixtieth day following such a state's instrument of
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
"Ratification", "acceptance", "approval" and "accession" in the sense
of Article 126 means in each case the international act whereby a
state establishes its consent to be bound by a treat/3. Pursuant to
Article 125 of the Rome Statute, the Statute was open for signature
83 Article 2 (1) (b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties reprinted
in Brownlie (ed) Basic Documents in International Law (1995) 388-425
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until 31 December 2000. To date 139 states have signed and 32 have
already ratified the Rome Statute.84
Although the signature of a treaty may under certain circumstances
constitute a means of manifesting its acceptance", Article 125 of the
Rome Statute specifies that this is to be only a preliminary step,
necessarily to be followed by a deposit of instruments of ratification,
acceptance or approval." The signature obviously indicates an
intention to become a state party of the Rome Statute, but does not
lead to any further legal consequences, according to the Statute.
However, pursuant to Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, a signatory state is obliged not to defeat the object and
purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into force. Above all, the signature
of the Statute manifests the state's intent to prepare for ratification,
acceptance or approval, a step that will almost invariably require
changes to its domestic legislation. Most states will need to adopt
implementing legislation or to make other adjustments in their
national law before ratifying. This process could take years, even
after the political decision to ratify the Statute has been made. Until
sixty states have ratified the Statute, the International Criminal Court
will not come into legal existence and therefore cannot exercise its
jurisdiction.
84 www.un.org/law/icc/statute/status.html(RatificationStatus as of 21 May
2001)
85 The ViennaConventionof LawTreaties (1969)Art. 11-12
86 Schabas "Follow up to Rome: Preparing for Entry into Force of the
InternationalCriminalCourt Statute"HRLJ 1999 157-157
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2 Jurisdiction ratione temporis
The jurisdiction of the Court is temporally limited. Article 11, para. (2)
of the Rome Statute stipulates that "the Court has jurisdiction only
with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of the
statute". This means that the Court does not have any retroactive
jurisdiction. The Court's jurisdiction cannot be exercised if the crime
was committed before the Statute entered into force. Although it is
recognised in lnternatlonal law'", Article 11 prohibits the retrospective
assumption of jurisdiction by the Court over conduct that was criminal
at the time that it was committed.
The jurisdiction ratione temporis must be distinguished from the
principle nul/urn crimen sine lege, because it just limits the jurisdiction
of the Court temporally. The crimes the Statute spells out in its Article
5 already existed before the Rome Statute was accepted. So far there
could be a prosecution which would not violate the principle nul/urn
crimen sine lege, but still be prevented from being prosecuted before
the Court under Article 11 of the Rome Statute.88 Article 11, para. (2)
stipulates, that "if a state becomes a Party to this Statute after its
entry into force, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction only with
respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of this Statute
for that state". However, the state can accept by declaration under
Article 12, para. (3) ad hoc the Court's jurisdiction over crimes
committed before the Statute enters into force in respect to that state.
87 Schroder Verantworllichkeit, Volkerstrafrecht, Streitbeilegung und
Sanktionen in Vitzthum (ed) Volkerrecht (2001) 545-572
88 Williams Arlicle 11 Jurisdiction ratione temporis in Triffterer (ed)
Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999)
323-324
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The temporal limitation of the Court's jurisdiction was necessary to
gain wide support among states.
3 The Exercise of the International Criminal Court's jurisdiction
Article 12 of the Rome Statute names the preconditions under which
the Court may exercise its jurisdiction. As it represents a compromise
between the different views of the states during the establishment of
the International Criminal Court and as it was one of the most
controversial issues of the Rome Conference, its structure is
complicated and far from being perfect. 89
All the various proposals according to the jurisdictional issue which
were brought up over the years establishing the International Criminal
Court were put before the Committee of the Whole during the Rome
Conference.
According to the structure of the Court's jurisdiction, there were four
proposals of importance which more or less formed the compromise
in Article 12.90
The proposal submitted by Germany provided that the Court's
jurisdiction could be exercised over any suspect regardless of
whether the territorial state, custodial state or any other state
concerned was a party to the Statute. The proposal was predicated
on the assumption that there existed universal jurisdiction under
international law for the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, and
89 Williams Article 12 Preconditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction in
Triffterer (ed) Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (1999) 329-341
90 Williams (supra 89) 333
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concluded that the Court should be in the same position to exercise
jurisdiction as states themselves."
The Korean proposal stipulated that, by becoming a party, a state
thereby accepts the jurisdiction of the court. The jurisdictional nexus
was that anyone or more of four state parties involved have
consented to the Court exercising jurisdiction over a case: either the
territorial state, the state of nationality of the accused and the victim
or the custodial state.92 This proposal attracted a great deal of
interest, even from those who would have preferred the German
proposal for universal jurtsdictlon."
The United States considered as fundamental that, if the Security
Council does not trigger the Court's jurisdiction, the consent of the
territorial state and of the state where the accused is a national of
must be given.94
The state 'opt-in' proposal required an actual second consent other
than being a party to the Statute. This means that the Court is
allowed to exercise its jurisdiction if either the custodial state, the
territorial state, the state that had requested extradition of the person
from the custodial state, (unless the request was rejected), the state
of the nationality of the accused or the state of the nationality of the
victim consented to the Court's jurisdictlon."
91 Proposalof GermanyU.N. Doc.AlAC.249/1998DP.2 (1998)
92 Proposalof the Republicof KoreaU.N. Doc.AlCONF.183/C.1/L.6(1998)
93 Williams(supra 89) 335
94 Proposalof the UnitedStatesof America U.N. Doc.AlCONF.183/C.1/L.70
11998)
5 Williams (supra 89) 337
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The structure of Article 12 partly shows elements of the different
proposals.
Article 12, para. (1) forms a "basic provision" of the Court's
jurisdiction, as it stipulates the acceptance of jurisdiction by becoming
a party to the Statute96• According to Article 12, para. (2), (a) and (b),
the Court has jurisdiction over all crimes, spelled out in Article 5, if
one of them was committed on the territory of a state party or the
accused is a national of a state party. Furthermore, a state which is
not a party to the Statute can accept the exercise of the court's
jurisdiction by declaration. According to the first two alternatives, the
Court has automatic or inherent junsdlction." According to the latter
alternative, the jurisdiction of the Court arises from the ad hoc
declaration of the state.
Article 12, paragraph (2) refers to Article 13, para. (a) and (c) and
must be read together. Accordingly, the Court can exercise its
jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in Article 5, if a situation
is referred to the Prosecutor by a state party or the Prosecutor has
initiated an investigation on his own in accordance with Article 15.
However, in those cases indispensable preconditions for the Court's
jurisdiction are that the jurisdiction was accepted by the state on
which territory the crime was committed or accepted by the state of
which the accused is a national.
Article 12, para. (2) refers to Article 13, para. (a) and (c) and not to
(b). As a consequence the acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction by a
state is only necessary if a state party refers the situation to the
Prosecutor or the Prosecutor has initiated an investigation proprio
96 See: ChapterTwo, 1
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motu. The question as to whether the Court may exercise its
jurisdiction should be answered by checking firstly how the situation
was referred to the Prosecutor (provisions of Article 13) and secondly
if the state involved has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court
(provisions of Article 12). This is because, if a situation was referred
to the prosecutor pursuant to Article 13, para. (b) by the Security
Council, the acceptance of a state is not necessary."
3.1 Referral by the Security Council
Article 13, para. (b) stipulates that, if the Security Council has
determined pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations that there is a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or an
act of aggression, it may refer such a situation to the Prosecutor. This
provision, in effect, acknowledges the primacy afforded to the
Security Council in maintaining intemational peace and security. The
Security Council has always had a wide range of powers under the
Charter to determine and respond to threats to intemational peace."
According to Article 13, para. (b), the referral must be under Chapter
VII and is therefore subject to the exercise of the veto power of the
permanent members of the Security Council10o• It is important to note
that, as already mentioned, if the Security Council has referred a
situation to the Prosecutor, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction
without the acceptance of a state. In case of a referral by the Security
97 Williams (supra 89) 339
98 Williams Article 13 Exercise of Jurisdiction in Triffterer (ed) Commentary
on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999) 343-350
99 MacCormack, Robertson "Jurisdictional Aspects of the Rome Statute for
the New International Criminal Court" MULR 1999 635-640
100 McGoldrick "The permanent International Court: an end to the culture of
impunity?" CLR 1999 627-642
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Council, Article 12 is not a precondition for the International Criminal
Court to exercise its jurisdiction.
If a state on whose territory a crime within the Court's jurisdiction was
committed by one of its nationals is not a party to the Statute, the
International Criminal Court is normally unable to act. The only way
for the Court to apply its jurisdiction is for the referral to initiate an
investigation to come from the Security Council of the United Nations.
Pursuant to Article 13, para. (b), the acceptance of the state in
question is not required in such a situation. Article 13, para. (b) is the
strongest means of the Statute to enable the International Criminal
Court to apply its jurisdiction.
However, in contrast to the two ad hoc Tribunals, which have the
possibility to defer national jurisdiction, the International Criminal
Court is bound to the principle of complementarity, even if the referral
comes from the Security Council. An interpretation of Article 18 and
17 may lead to the conclusion that the principle of complementarity is
not to be applied if the referral to investigate or prosecute is initiated
by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations pursuant to Article 13, para. (b). However, the principle of
complementarity is also located in the Preamble and Article 1 and is
therefore binding on all acts of the Court.
An exception to the principle of complementarity in case of a referral
by the Security Council is located in Article 16 of the Statute.
Pursuant to that provision, the investigation and prosecution of a state
which has jurisdiction can be deferred for a period of twelve months if
the deferral is included in the resolution adopted under Chapter VII of
the Charter of the United Nations. The deferral can be renewed for
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another twelve months under a new resolution of the Security
Council.
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3.2 Referral by a State Party
Article 13, para. (a) stipulates that the Court may exercise its
jurisdiction if a state party refers the situation to the Prosecutor.
Therefore, only state parties can trigger the jurisdiction of the Court
with respect to the crimes named in Article 5. Non-state parties can
not refer ad hoc a situation to the Prosecutor. This right belongs only
to state parties. Every state that is a party to the Statute can without
restriction refer a situation to the Prosecutor, irrespective whether it is
involved in the situation or not.
One will have to wait to see to what extent state parties will use their
right to refer a situation to the Court. As the experience of human
rights treaties has demonstrated, mechanisms which provide for
state-based complaint procedures have been greatly under-utilised,
because states are hesitant to initiate proceedings against other
states or their nationals due to the political and diplomatic
ramifications of doing SO.101 There is little indication that the Rome
Statute's provision for state-based complaints will experience greater
popularity. It seems much more likely that most of the Court's work
will come through referrals by the Security Council rather than by a
state party.
3.3 Investigations initiated by the Prosecutor
According to Article 13, para. (c), the Prosecutor can initiate an
investigation in accordance with Article 15. The proprio motu power is
essential to the effective functioning and independence of the
101 McCormack, Robertson (supra 99) 642
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Court.102 Therefore, the prosecutor is empowered under the Statute
to receive information on potential crimes from a variety of sources,
including state organs of the United Nations, intergovernmental and
non-governmental organisations and other reliable sources.l'" The
concept of an independent prosecutor was viewed critically by several
states. Such delegations expressed concern about the potential for
abuse of the prosecutor's power and the instigation of politically
motivated complaints. These concerns resulted in a number of
provisions being incorporated into the Statute that should minimise
the possibility of a misuse of Article 13, para. (c). According to Article
15, para. (3), the Prosecutor must obtain the authorisation of the Pre-
Trail Chamber before proceeding with an investigation. The Pre-Trail
Chamber is obliged to determine that there is a reasonable basis to
proceed and that the case falls within the jurisdiction of the Court.104
The potential for the Prosecutor to act independently with the
authorisation of the Pre-Trail Chamber will help assuage concerns
about the inherently political considerations of the Security Council as
well as of individual states.105
If the jurisdiction is triggered either by a referral of a party state or by
the prosecutor, the Court may only exercise its jurisdiction in contrast
to a referral by the Security Council under the preconditions of Article
12.
102 Williams (supra 98) 350
103 See: Art. 15 (2) Statute of Rome
104 See: Art. 15 (4) Statute of Rome
105 McCromack, Robertson (supra 99) 643
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3.2.1 The Acceptance of the Territorial State
Article 12, para. (2) (a) stipulates that in case of a referral by a party
state or by the Prosecutor, the state of the territory on which the
conduct in question occurred must have accepted the jurisdiction of
the Court. Article 12, para. (2) (a) is closely related to the principle of
territorial jurisdiction. The territorial jurisdiction is a manifestation of
state sovereignty.106 A state has plenary jurisdiction over persons,
property and conduct occurring in its territory, subject only to the
obligations or limitations imposed by international law. This is the
universally accepted working rule in international criminal law and can
be found in bilateral extradition treaties and multilateral
conventlons.l'" In becoming a party to the Statute, a state delegates
part of its jurisdiction to the Court. If a crime within the jurisdiction of
the International Criminal Court occurs on the territory of a state
party, the Court can under certain preconditions (Article 17) exercise
its jurisdiction 'in the name' of the territorial state.
3.2.2 The Acceptance of the Nationality of the Accused
Article 12, para. (2) (b) stipulates that the Court may exercise its
jurisdiction if the state of which the accused is a national has
accepted the jurisdiction of the Court. This provision is therefore
related to the active personality principle. According to the article, the
acceptance of a state party is only necessary if the situation was
referred to the Prosecutor through a state party or the Prosecutor
initiated an investigation on his own motion. Article 12, para. (2) (b)
106 See: ChapterOne, 2.1.1
107 Williams (supra a9) 340
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contains the active personality principle. The active personality
principle justifies extraterritorial jurisdiction and is mainly applied by
the civil law countrtes.l'" As under the acceptance of the territorial
state, the state of nationality transfers part of its ability to exercise its
jurisdiction over its nationals to the International Criminal Court. The
delegation of the jurisdiction becomes legal with the ratification of the
Statute and thereby affects the national legislative, executive and
judicial branches.
3.2.3 Acceptance by a Non-Party State
Article 12, para. (3) provides the option for states to declare their
acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction with respect to the crime in
question. Such a state is then obligated to cooperate with the Court in
accordance with Part Nine of the Rome Statute.
The question is whether Article 12, para. (3) is in compliance with the
law of treaties in giving a retroactive application of jurisdiction.109
Article 11 is contradictory to Article 12, para. (3). As has been
mentioned, Article 11 prohibits the retrospective assumption of
jurisdiction by the Court over conduct that was criminal at the time
that it was committed. In contrast, Article 12, para. (3) allows the
court, in case of an acceptance by declaration, to exercise its
jurisdiction over conduct, although the jurisdictional power of the
Court over that crime did not exist at the time it was committed.
Article 12, para. (3) could therefore violate Article 28 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which stipulates that treaties are
not given retroactive application "[t]o any act or fact which took place
108 See: Chapter One, 2.1.3
109 Williams (supra 89) 341
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or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into
the force of the treaty with respect to that party".
However, the acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction according to
Article 12, para. (3) will always be dedared voluntarily by a state and
regardless of the Statute as a treaty. Accordingly, the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties cannot be applied to a declaration
according to Article 12, paragraph (3).
3.2.4 Universal Jurisdiction
Article 12 requires either the acceptance of the state where the crime
was committed or the acceptance of the state of which the accused is
a national. Recalling the principle of universal jurisdiction, it has been
established in customary and conventional international law that
certain crimes are against the universal interest, offend against
universal public policy and are universally condemned. Moreover, the
tendency according to universal jurisdiction seems to be that states
not only have the right to prosecute the crimes concerned but more
than that are obliged by international law to do so. 110
All the crimes spelled out under Article 5 are crimes which trigger the
universal jurisdiction. This means that if a crime according to Article 5
was committed, every state can apply its jurisdiction irrespective of an
acceptance of the state where the crime was committed or of which
the accused is a national.
The question arises as to whether a single state is empowered
through the principle of universality to prosecute such crimes and can
- 47-
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
therefore apply its jurisdiction; must the International Criminal Court
established by the international community not then have the right to
apply its jurisdiction through the principle of universality.
It is nothing new in the history of international law for a group of
states to set up a tribunal to prosecute perpetrators, justified by
universal jurisdiction. This happened when the United States agreed
with France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, but not with
Germany, to establish the International Military Tribunal at
Nurernberq.l"
However, Article 12 denies that the principle of universality is
applicable to the International Criminal Court in requiring the different
acceptances of the Court's jurisdiction by the states. The requirement
of the consent of state parties would be unnecessary if the principle of
universality would be applicable through the International Criminal
Court.
Accordingly, it might have been said that universal jurisdiction (the
principle of universality) is a legal figure which strongly depends on
political dynamics. After the Second World War universal jurisdiction
was widely accepted by the victorious Allies to prosecute the German
Nazis and could be delegated to a collective international court based
on a treaty. However, during the establishment of a permanent
international criminal court, the reach of universal jurisdiction was
limited because of foreign policy considerations of the United States,
although they were one of the leading powers in the prosecution and
punishment after the Second World War.
110 See: Chapter One, 2.1.6
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3.2.5 Jurisdiction over a National of a Non-Party State
Article 12, para. (2) stipulates that "the Court may exercise its
jurisdiction if one or more of the following states (the territorial state
and the state of nationality) are Parties to this Statute". Consequently,
the state on the territory of which the crime in question occurred or
the state of which the accused is a national must have accepted the
jurisdiction of the Court.
It is obvious that there might be cases in which nationals of non-party
states commit crimes, spelled out in Article 5, on a territory of a state
party. Under consideration here is whether the Court can exercise its
jurisdiction over nationals of the non-party state if the crime was
committed on the territory of a state party. The possibility of such a
scenario was the reason for the United States voting against the
Rome Statute.112
The question arises as to whether the Rome Statute allows the Court
to exercise its jurisdiction over a national of a non-party state and, if it
does, what legal basis justifies the International Criminal Court to
exercise its jurisdiction in such a case? The law of international
treaties might prohibit the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction over
nationals of a non-party state. If Article 12 justifies the exercise of
jurisdiction over a national of a non-party state, it might infringe Article
34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which stipulates
that "a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third
state without its consent". If the Court would be empowered through
111 See: Chapter One, 1.2.1 and 2.2.1
112 Scharf The ICC's Jurisdiction over Nationals of Non-Party States in
Sewall, Kaysen (eds) The United States and the International Criminal
Court (2000) 213-213
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the Statute to exercise its jurisdiction in such cases, the Rome Statute
could have the same effect on a non-party state as it has on a party
state. However, the question is whether the exercise of jurisdiction
means "creating obligations" in the sense of Article 34 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. If a state is bound to a treaty, it
has certain obligations, which are constituted in the treaty. According
to the Rome Statute, the parties are (for example) obligated to
provide funding, extradite persons or provide evidence. These are
duties mentioned in the Statute that a party state has to fulfil. In
contrast to that, the exercise of jurisdiction over a person cannot be
defined as an obligation of the treaty.113This is because the "exercise
of jurisdiction" is a result of the Statute of Rome not only as a
multilateral treaty, but also as the constitution of the International
Criminal Court. The duty to cooperate with the International Criminal
Court, for instance, represents a pure obligation in the sense of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. However, the exercise of
jurisdiction over a national of a non-party state does not oblige the
state and consequently means not "creating obligations" in the sense
of Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. It is a
misconception that the Statute binds non-party states. They are not
obligated to cooperate. A violation of Article 34 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties must be denied.
Yet if Article 12, with its possibility of exercising jurisdiction over a
national of non-party state, does not violate the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, there must be a legal basis in international law
that allows the Court to apply its jurisdiction in such a case.
113 Scharf (supra 112) 220
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The Intemational Criminal Court could legitimise its jurisdiction over
nationals of a non-party state with the principle of universal
jurisdiction.
After the Rome Statute was signed by the majority of the states, the
United States of America stood for the position that the Intemational
Criminal Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction on the basis of the
principle of universality over nationals of a non-party state. The main
arguments of the United States were: firstly, universal jurisdiction
cannot be delegated to an intemational court based on a collective
intemational treaty; secondly, some of the crimes within the subject-
matter jurisdiction are not recognised as crimes of universal
jurisdiction; and thirdly, Article 12 rejects universal jurisdiction by
requiring the consent of the state of the perpetrator's nationality or the
state in whose territory the offence took place.!"
The question as to whether universal jurisdiction can be delegated to
an intemational court, on the basis of a collective treaty, was already
broached.!" During the Nuremberg Trials the German defendants
could not claim that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction over crimes that
any state could prosecute because each state creating or agreeing to
the competence of the Tribunal had "done together what anyone of
them might have done singly".116 Indeed they could create such a
tribunal with or without the consent of Germany, and the tribunal
could and did prosecute German nationals even when the accused
had not committed crimes within the territory of the Allies. Therefore,
the transfer of part of the universal jurisdictional competence of a
114 Scharf (supra 112) 213
115 See: Chapter Two, 3.2.4
116 Paust "The Reach of ICC Jurisdiction over Non-Signatory Nationals"
VJTL 20001-4
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state to the International Criminal Court is possible and in compliance
with international law.!" If single states cannot delegate universal
jurisdictional competence to an international court, it then would be
very difficult to explain the legitimacy of the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg and the International Military Tribunal for the
Far East.
The question, then, is whether all crimes within the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the Court in fact enjoy universal jurisdiction under
customary international law. The Statute of Rome was understood not
to create new substantive law, but only to include crimes which were
already prohibited under international law.118 The jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court is limited to the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole.119 The four crimes
spelled out in Article 5 - the crime of genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression - are recognised as
crimes of universal jurisdiction under customary international law by
most states and commentators.F'' That is, even without complete
accord on the exact definition of each offence, the delegations to the
Rome Diplomatic Conference generally seemed confident of the
possibility of defining their scope of purposes of the Court's universal
jurisdiction.121 This was not different from what the Allies did in 1945
when they enumerated the first definitions of crimes against humanity
in the Charter of Nuremberg or what the international community did
in 1958 when it established the first codified definition of piracy in the
117 Paust (supra 116) 5
118 Scharf (supra 112) 217
119 McGoldrick (supra 100) 633
120 Scharf (supra 112) 217
121 Scharf (supra 112) 217
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Law of the Sea Convention 122. Both were subsequently viewed as
codification of customary law.123 Therefore it can be said that the
crimes within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court are recognized as crimes which trigger universal
jurisdiction.
Although universal jurisdiction seems to be applicable for the
International Criminal Court, Article 12 obviously does reject it. The
fact that Article 12, para. (2) (a) and (b) requires the acceptance of
the territorial state or the state of the accused as precondition to the
exercise of the Court's jurisdiction clearly denies universal jurisdiction.
It lies in the nature of universal jurisdiction, that courts may exercise
their jurisdiction over crimes without the acceptance of the state
where the crime was committed or the accused is a national. The
requirement of the consent of the state on whose territory the crime
was committed would be unnecessary if the Court's basis for
jurisdiction was universality. Also the rejection of the German and
Korean proposatl" during the Conference of Rome substantiates that
the International Criminal Court should not have universal jurisdiction.
Therefore, jurisdiction over the nationals of a non-party state cannot
be justified in terms universal jurisdiction due to the Rome Statute,
which is a compromise that does not allow the Court to apply the
principle of universality.
122 Conventionon the High Seas (1958) reprinted in Mueller,Wise (eds)
International Criminal Law (1965) 215-217
123 Scharf (supra 112) 217
124 The Germanand the Korean proposalaccordingto the jurisdictionof
InternationalCriminalCourt predeterminethat the InternationalCriminal
Court shouldhave universaljurisdiction over the core crimes.See: Chapter
Two,3
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However, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction over a national of a
non-party state- on the basis of the prindple of territoriality. It is
doubtless accepted in international law that a state can exercise its
jurisdiction over the nationals of other states without the consent of
the latter if the crime was committed within its boundaries. The
decisive question is whether a state can delegate its territorial
jurisdiction to an international court. The principle of territoriality is a
consequence of the sovereignty of a state over its territory. A state
can apply national law on all acts committed within its boundaries
irrespective of the nationality of the offender or victim.125 If a state
ratifies the Statute of Rome, the treaty becomes part of national law,
upon its ratification (transformation into national law). Consequently
waiving sovereignty in delegating territorial jurisdiction is constituted
in national law.
Besides, the principle of territoriality was also a basis for the
Nuremberg Tribunal's jurisdiction. In the Einsatzgruppen trial, the
CCL 10 Tribunal indicated that its jurisdiction and that of the
Nuremberg Tribunal were based on a mixture of the universal
jurisdiction and the principle of territoriality:
"In spite of all that has been said in this and other cases, no
one would be so bold as to suggest that what occurred
between Germany and Russia from June 1941 to May 1945
was anything but war and, being war, that Russia would not
have the right to try the alleged violators of the rules of war
on her territory and against her people. And if Russia may do
125 See: Chapter One, 2.1.1
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this alone, certainly she may concur with other nations who
affirm that right.,,126
The principle of territoriality was delegated during the prosecution of
the German perpetrators to the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg. The Nuremberg Trails demonstrate that the principle of
territoriality as the princiole of universality can be transferred to an
international body. Hence to delegate part of the territorial jurisdiction
to the International Criminal Court is possible without violating the
rules of international law.
Hence jurisdiction over a national of a non-party state is possible. The
legal basis of such a far-reaching jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court can, however, not be seen in the principle of
universality. Due to Article 12, which obviously prohibits the
application of universal jurisdiction, it is only justified through a
transfer of the domestic courts' territorial jurisdiction to the
International Criminal Court.
3.2.6 Conflicts of International Obligations
After advocating for the appliance of the International Criminal Court's
jurisdiction over nationals of a non-party state, another problem
arises. Whenever a third state 127 has concluded a treaty with a state
party whereby the latter state either waives its criminal jurisdiction
over crimes committed on its territory by nationals of the former state
or undertakes to extradite those nationals to the other state. In such a
case a conflict between the different inconsistent international
126United States v. Otto Ohlendorf reprinted in (extracts) Scharf (supra 112)
229
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obligations obviously arises. The Statute of Rome only partly takes
into account and makes provisions for such situations. Article 90,
para. 4 to 6 envisages the possibility that extradition may be
requested, under an international treaty, by a state not party to a state
party, and this request for extradition will be in conflict with a request
tor surrender from the International Criminal Court. For such cases
the Statute does not impose upon state parties the obligation to give
priority to the Court's request for surrender from the International
Criminal Court. Article 90, para. (6) simply lists a set of factors that
the requested state must take into account when deciding on the
matter.
This regulation would seem to be questionable on three grounds: first,
it does not take into account the possibility that under its national
legislation the requested state may be obliged to waive its jurisdiction
without even triggering the extradition process; secondly, it does not
envisage the case of a requested state, that while not a party to the
Statute has accepted the Court's jurisdiction ad hoc; thirdly, it does
not impose upon the requested state the obligation to give priority to
the Court's request for surrender.
3.2.7 Conflicts between Article 12 and Article 11
Article 11, para. (1) of the Rome Statute stipulates that the Court will
only have jurisdiction with respect to crimes committed after it has
come into force. Article 11, para. (2) stipulates if a state becomes a
party to the Statute after it has come into force, the Court only has
jurisdiction over crimes committed after the Statute has come into
force for that state, unless that state has made a declaration under
127 A third state is state that is no party to the Statute
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Article 12, para. (3). The relationship between Article 11, para. (2)
and Article 12, para. (2) is unclear. Under Article 12 the consent of
either the territorial state or the state of nationality of the accused
suffices for the Court to exercise its jurisdiction. A similar conflict of
jurisdiction over nationals of a non-party state occurs. There may be
cases in which the Court, under Article 12, will have jurisdiction over a
crime due to the consent of the state where the crime was committed,
even though the state of nationality of the accused has become party
to the Statute after it has come into force but is not in force for it. The
question is whether this conflict can be solved as the conflict of the
jurisdiction over a national of a non-party state.
It might be said that if the Court can exercise its jurisdiction over a
national of a non-party state, then the Court must be able to do so
over a national of a state which already became a party to the Statute
but is not in force for it.
However, the conflict of the jurisdiction over a national of a non-party
state and the conflict between Article 11 and Article 12 must be
distinguished and should not be compared to one another. The
problem of jurisdiction over the national of a non-party state is a
question of jurisdiction ratione loci, while the conflict between Article
11 and Article 12 is a question of jurisdiction ratione temporis.
Therefore it cannot be said that in such a case the Court may
exercise its jurisdiction, just because the exercise of jurisdiction over
a national of a non-party state is possible.
Article 12, para. (2) clearly emphasises that the temporal jurisdiction
for such a state party begins after the Statute has come into force.
Further Article 11, para. (2) became part of the Statute to encourage
acceptance by states. Accordingly, it can be said that as long as the
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Court does not have temporal jurisdiction under Article 11, para. (2), it
cannot exercise its jurisdiction, even if the crime was committed
within the territory of a state party.
3.2.8 Relationship between Article 12 and Article 124
Another aspect of the Court's jurisdictional competence, only in
respect of war crimes, is the capacity of party states to elect to
exclude the Court from dealing with war crimes alleged to have been
committed either on their territory or by any of their nationals.
Whereas in the case of both genocide and crimes against humanity
the Court will exercise automatic jurisdiction over party states, Article
124 encapsulates an exception from this general approach in respect
of war crimes spelled out in Article 8. Therefore the opting-out
provision in Article 124 stipulates that a state party may declare that,
for a period of seven years after the Statute has come into force, it
will not accept the jurisdiction of the Court in relation to crimes under
Article 8, if they were committed within its territory or by its nationals.
It seems that the "or" in Article 124 was not meant to be exclusive,
since the drafters would have used an 'either/or' formula. Thus a state
might also cumulatively exclude both: those war crimes committed by
its nationals and those committed on its territory.128
Obviously there might be situations where a national of a state party
which opted out of the Statute under Article 124 committed a war
128 Zimmermann Article 124 Transnational Provision in Triffterer (ed)
Commentary on the Rome Statute ot tne International Criminal Court (1999)
1281-1284
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crime on the territory of a state which has accepted the Court's
jurisdiction.129
The question then arises whether the Court can exercise its
jurisdiction over nationals of a party state which has opted out of the
Statute under Article124, and the war crime was committed on the
territory of a state that has unconditionally accepted the jurisdiction of
the Court. This conflict is similar to the conflict of the jurisdiction over
a national of a non-party state and the problems that arise with the
relationship between Article 11 and Article 12. However, it must be
said that the limitation on the Court's jurisdiction incorporated in
Article 124 was intentional (a part of the package which assembled
an overwhelming majority in support of the Statute). The idea of the
transnational provision in Article 124 was not contained in the Draft
Statute but only appeared during the last few days of the Conference
in Rome in order to secure the acceptance of the Statute by certain
states.P" Its effect should not be wiped out or substantially reduced
by another provision in the Statute. If other instruments of the Statute
do not resolve the incongruity, then it should be construed narrowly
as intended by the neqotlators.!"
If it was clear that the Court could exercise its jurisdiction in such
cases, Article 124 would not provide the possibility to opt out of the
Statute according to its nationals. Moreover Article 124 would only
provide the altemative to object to the jurisdiction of the Court, if a
crime under Article 8 were committed on its territory. Hence the text
of Article 124 would be: "...it does not accept the jurisdiction of the
129 Arsanjani Reflections on the Jurisdiction and Trigger Mechanism of the
International Criminal Court in von Hebel et al (eds) Reflections on the
International Criminal Court (1999) 57-64
130 Zimmermann (supra 128) 1281
131 Arsanjani (supra 129) 65
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Court (...) when a crime is alleged to have been committed on its
territory." However, the intention of the negotiators of Article 124 was
that crimes committed by nationals of a party state also fall under
Article 124.
Accordingly it can be said that any such opting-out completely bars
the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court in regard to alleged war
crimes committed either by nationals or on the territory of the state
which has made the declaration under Article 124.132 The Court
cannot exercise its jurisdiction over a national of a party state if it
opted out of the Statute under Article 124.
However, declarations made under Article 124 are only relevant when
the Court is exercising its jurisdiction by virtue of a state referral or
when the prosecutor is acting proprio motu. If the situation is referred
to the Court by the Security Council, any such declarations are
irrelevant, since Article 12 (2) stipulates that the acceptance of the
jurisdiction of the Court by either the home state of the suspect or the
state on the territory of which the crime has been committed is
superfluous.F"
Another closely related question is how the withdrawal or expiry
affects the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. According
to the wording of Article 124, it could be possible that the Court might
be empowered to exercise its jurisdiction over a war crime committed
in the declaration's period but after the Statute came into force if the
declaration is somehow termlnated.P" Article 11 makes no reference
132 Zimmermann (supra 128) 1282
133 Zimmermann (supra 128) 1283
134 Wilmshurst Jurisdiction of the Court in Lee (ed) The International
Criminal Court The Making of the Rome Statute Issues, Negotiations,
Results (1999) 127-140
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to Article 124 and therefore emphasises the possibility. However, the
failure of a reference in Article 11 originates from the fact that Article
124 was added to the Statute at the very last stage of the
negotiations.135 Again it must be said that Article 124 was added to
the Statute in order to satisfy the majority of delegations during the
Rome Conference. Hence Article 124 must be read in a narrow
sense. If a state has opted out under Article 124, th'3 Court's
jurisdiction is barred for a period of seven years. In case of expiry or
withdrawal the Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction over war crimes
covered by the declaration until its termination.
135 Wilmshurst (supra 134) 141
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Chapter Three: The Admissibility of a Case before the
International Criminal Court
The issue of the admissibility of a case before the International
Criminal Court is one of the most important issues affecting the future
work of the Court. Whether the Court ever becomes a 'real' Court and
not just a 'ghost institution' mostly depends, besides the jurisdictional
issue, on the provisions of admissibility of a case before it.
The Statute of Rome is, on the one hand, irrefutably a great step
towards international justice but, on the other hand, it is still a
compromise between more than 160 governments and numerous
non-governmental organisations. The question is whether the main
task of the International Criminal Court - complementing the national
judicial systems and ensuring that persons committing the most
serious crimes of international concern are brought to justice - can be
fulfilled with the means provided by the Statute of Rome.
Admissibility criteria and procedures are spelled out in Article 17 and
18 and are applied in conjunction with the double jeopardy principles
of Article 20. Besides that, as a related area under consideration,
there is Article 19 and its provisions to challenge the jurisdiction of the
Court and the admissibility of a case before it.
The Statute establishes a Ipresumption"136 (Tatbestand) of
inadmissibility whenever a state is exercising, or has exercised, its
national jurisdiction over a case. Therefore the most general and
effective jurisdictional limit on the International Criminal Court lies in
136 "Presumption" in this context means more the elements of a rule
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its relationship to national Courts. It is because of the complementary
relationship of the Court to the national judicial systems that Article 17
of the Statute does not emphasise when a case is admissible, but
only determines when it is not. Hence it once more stresses the
cautious policy of the negotiators in Rome in the context of national
jurisdiction.
The aim of the Statute is not to negate or encroach onto state
sovereignty, but to complement national criminal systems and thereby
close 'judicial gaps' on an international level. Article 17 provides
safeguards that preserve national interests and judicial integrity on a
domestic level.137 Referring to Article 1 and Paragraph 10 of the
Preamble, Article 17 emphasises the two fundamental principles: the
first dealing only with the most serious crimes of international concem
and the second the principle of comptementarlty.!" Complementarity
as a feature of the Statute defines the relationship of the International
Criminal Court to the national criminal systems.
1 The Composition of the International Criminal Court
Before discussing the principle of complementarity and examining the
admissibility of a case before the International Criminal Court, it is
necessary to give a broad overview of the International Criminal
Court's composition.
137 WilliamsArticle 17 Issues of Admissibility in Triffterer (ed) Commentary
on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999) 383-384
138 McGoldrick(supra 100) 643
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The intemational Criminal Court consists of the judicial, the
investigatory and prosecutortat'", and the administrative branches 140.
Pursuant to Article 34, the judicial branch is composed of the
Presidency, the Appeals Division, a Trial Division and a Pre-Trial
Division.
The Assembly of the state parties elects the eighteen judges for a
nine-year term. The candidates must have established competence in
criminal proceedings or in the relevant areas of international law.
There is a minimum requirement of nine judges: four with competency
in criminal proceedings and five with competence in the relevant
areas of international law.141 Besides that, the judges shall be chosen
from among persons of high moral character, impartiality and
integrity.
In the Appeals Division sit the president and four other judges. All of
them participate in the Appeals Chamber. Not fewer than six judges
have to be in the Trial Division. The trial chamber consists of three
judges. In the Pre-Trial Division there are to be not fewer than six
judges. A pre-trial chamber has either three judges or a single judge.
Judges assigned to the appeals division can only serve in that
division.142
The Office of the Prosecutor is composed of the Prosecutor and is an
independent and separate organ of the International Criminal
139 The Office of the Prosecutor
140 The Registry
141 See: Art. 36 Statute of Rome
142 Ambos "Der neue Internationale Strafgerichtshof - Ein Oberblick" NJW
19983743-3744
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Court.143 There can be one or more deputy prosecutors. They are
also elected by the Assembly of the state parties.
2 Complementarity and the Relationship between the
International Criminal Court and National Courts
One fundamental question in establishing the International Criminal
Court was the role that the institution would play in relation to the
national courts. It was a politically and legally sensitive issue for the
negotiators in Rome.144 According to Article 1 and Paragraph 10 of
the Preamble of the Statute, the Court shall be complementary to the
national criminal justice system. The principle of complementarity as it
is spelled out in Article 1 and Paragraph 10 of the Preamble is
precisely described in Articles 12 through 15, 17 and 18. According to
these provisions, the principle of complementarity is one of most the
important principles of the Statute and basically means that the Court
may exercise its jurisdiction only when national jurisdiction is unable
or unwilling to exercise it. This means that the International Criminal
Court's role in investigating and prosecuting the crimes falling within
its mandate is secondary to that of the states. One should be aware
of the fact that without the principle of complementarity, the
establishment of the International Criminal Court hardly would have
been possible. In the attempts in the history of setting up a permanent
international criminal institution, the main obstacle was how to get
national sovereignty and international prosecution into a harmonious
relationship.
143 Ambos (supra 142) 3744
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The choice of "complementarity" was therefore, of course, a
conscious and intentional one. The decision by the intemational
community of states to negotiate a Statute for a new permanent
international criminal court, while undertaken with an acute sense of
the historical significance of such an institution, was never intended to
override state sovereignty. The real question in Rome was one of
demarcation - where to draw the line on the guarantee of national
court primacy - and of determination - who would decide on which
side of that line a particular case fell.145
Because of the principle of complementarity the Court is not intended
to replace national courts, but to operate when national courts are
unwilling or unable to operate. It was the understanding of the
majority of participating states during the Conference that states had
a vital interest in remaining responsible and accountable for
prosecuting violations of their laws, and national systems are
expected to be maintained to enforce adherence to international
standards.!"
Consequently the issue of whether the International Criminal Court
should be fitted with primary or complementary jurisdiction was a
controversial one during the negotiations in Rome.147 Some states
and most of the non-govemmental organisations stood for a strong
international criminal court.l" The International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia advocated indirectly for an International
Criminal Court with primary jurisdiction over national courts. It said:
144 Holmes The Principle of Complementarity in Lee (ed) The International
Criminal Court The Making of the Rome Statute Issues, Negotiations,
Results (1999) 41-41
145 Roggemann (supra 16) 10
146 Arsanjani (supra 129) 68
147 Holmes (supra 144) 42
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"[I]ndeed, when an international criminal tribunal such as the
present one is created, it must be endowed with primacy
over national courts. Otherwise, human nature being what it
is, there would be perennial danger of international crimes
being characterized as 'ordinary crimes' [...], or proceedings
being 'designed to shield the accused', or cases not being
diligently prosecuted [...]. If not effectively countered by the
principle of primacy, anyone of those stratagems might be
used to defeat the very purpose of creation of an
international criminal jurisdiction, to the benefit of the very
people whom it has been designed to prosecute ..,149
However, it must be said, that an International Criminal Court with
primacy jurisdiction never would have become reality. Due to the
principle of complementarity the Statute of Rome was finally able to
satisfy the majority of the party states in Rome. Beside that, primacy
might be the better solution for international criminal tribunals,
established under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
but there are also good reasons for a complementary jurisdiction of a
permanent international criminal institution.
According to the Statute, states have a primary role and a prior right
of jurisdiction (unless the Security Council refers a situation to the
Court. 150). This is as it should be, because in deference to the
principle of national sovereignty, states have a right or even a duty to
148 Holmes (supra 144) 42
149 Prosecutor v. Tadic (Case No. IT-94-1-AR72) (supra 79) 56
150 Due to the principle of complementarity as the strongest feature of the
Statute, the Court must defer to national jurisdiction if its investigation and
prosecution correspond with the standard set up in the Statute.
Theoretically even if the case is referred to the Court by the Security
Council. However, this theoretic construction will barley become reality.
See: Chapter Two, 3.1
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try offences that take place on their territory or otherwise fall within
their jurisdiction.l'" Moreover, state criminal justice systems are
generally better developed than the international system and are
likely to be faster and more efficient.152 This is because the actors at
a national level work within the context of an established legal
system, the applicable law is reasonably certain and developed, the
rules of procedure and evidence are clear and the penalties are
clearly defined and readily enforceable, and the language problem is
minimal.153 Finally it is a matter of fact that the International Criminal
Court depends on an effective and supportive prosecution of crimes
within its jurisdiction by national courts. It would be flooded with cases
and become ineffective if international crimes were not also
investigated and prosecuted on a domestic level.154
However, the record of national prosecutions of violators of such
international norms as the grave breaches of the Geneva conventions
is disappointing, even when the obligations to prosecute or extradite
are unequivocal.155 A lack of resources, evidence and, above all,
political will has stood in the way. Moreover, there are instances when
states, because of their complicity in the crimes in question, have not
been willing or able to investigate or institute proceedings in particular
situations to a level of competence that satisfies the demands of
international justice. It was for these reasons that the International
Criminal Court was established to complement states' efforts and to
ensure that crimes of concern to the international community as a
whole are adequately prosecuted. There is a good chance that the
151 Cassese "The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some
Preliminary Reflections" EJll 1999 144-158
152 Williams (supra 137) 384
153 Nsereko "The International Criminal Court: Jurisdictional and Related
Issues" ClF 199987-114
154 Cassese (supra 151) 158
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principle of complementarity helps to remedy the defect of national
prosecution for crimes triggering universal jurisdiction. This is
because states would rather prosecute the criminals concerned within
their range of influence than give up that possibility and thereby lose
their predominance in respect of the case. Moreover, this effect is
supported by the growing tendency of the International Court of
Justice according to develop the concept of universal jurisdiction.
Although the case Congo versus Belgium has not been decided yet, it
seems to be the inclination of the International Court of Justice that
applying universal jurisdiction becomes not only a right of states but
more a duty.156
Nonetheless, one must be aware that the principle of
complementarity can also be abused to shield perpetrators from
being punished for their crimes. Regarding the crimes against
humanity and genocide, the abuse of the principle of complementarity
is more likely. This is because these crimes are normally are
committed with the help and assistance, or the connivance or
consent, of national authorities.157In these situations the officials of a
state rather tend to pretend to undertake investigations, trials
prosecution to protect the allegedly responsible persons.P"
The danger of abuse increases due to the fact that the principle of
complementarity also applies to third states.159Article 18 obliges the
Prosecutor to "notify all states parties and those states which, taking
into account the information available, would normally exercise
155 Nsereko(supra 153) 115
156 Congov. Belgium (supra 52)
157 Cassese(supra 151) 159
158 Cassese(supra 151) 159
159 The question if Art. 18 (1) also applies to third stateswill be discussed
beneath.See: ChapterThree, 5
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jurisdiction over the crimes concerned" that he/she commence an
investigation pursuant to Article 13, para. (a) or initiate an
investigation proprio motu. Moreover, although there is no need for a
notification, if the Prosecutor is initiating an investigation pursuant to
Article 13, para. (b), the state which normally has jurisdiction over the
crime forming the object of the referral is obliged to inform the
Prosecutor that it is investigating or prosecuting the case.160 All these
various possibilities under which third states may claim jurisdiction
may invoke the principle of complementarity and therefore may oblige
the prosecutor to defer to the state's authorities.161 Although Article
17 provides safeguards against abuse of the principle of
complementarity, one has to be aware that the delicate and fragile
structure of a complementary jurisdiction at an international level can
be an invitation for misuse.
3 The Jurisdictional Difference between the International
Criminal Tribunal and the Ad-hoc Tribunals
In order to point out the jurisdictional differences between the
International Criminal Court and the two ad hoc Tribunals, it is
necessary to look at the different natures of these organisations. Both
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda are subsidiary organs of
the Security Council of the United Nations, created by virtue of
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and therefore vested
with certain inherent powers. But the International Criminal Court will
be treaty based and under the supervision of an Assembly of state
parties with only indirect links to the Security Council and more limited
160 Cassese (supra 151) 159
161 Cassese (supra 151) 159
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enforcement powers.162 It is one thing for the Security Council of the
United Nations to establish Tribunals with primary jurisdiction over
national courts pursuant to the Council's enforcement powers under
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. However, it is
altogether a different thing for the states of the international
community to negotiate the terms of a multilateral treaty dealing with
this sensitive issue of jurisdictional relatlonshlp.l'"
The Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals provide concurrent jurisdiction
with national courts and primacy so far that they may at any stage
request national courts to defer to the competence of the Tribunals. In
contrast, the International Criminal Court complements the national
criminal system and therefore has no primacy, unless the Security
Council refers a situation to the Court. However, the primacy of
jurisdiction under a referral of the Security Council has to be
distinguished from the possibility of the two ad hoc Tribunals to defer
national jurisdiction. In the case of the International Criminal Court,
the Security Council must, pursuant to Article 16 of the Statute, adopt
the deferral of national jurisdiction in a resolution under Chapter VII of
the Charter of the United Nations. This deferral is limited for a period
of twelve months and can be renewed under the same conditions. In
contrast, the power of the ad hoc Tribunals to apply primary
jurisdiction over national courts is laid down in their Statutes and has
no temporal limitation.
4 TheAdmissibility of a Case according to Article 17
162 May The Relationship between the International Criminal Court and the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in von Hebel et al
(eds) Relections on the International Criminal Court 155-155
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Article 17 of the Statute forms the backbone of the admissibility of a
case before the International Criminal Court. It is divided into three
paragraphs. The first paragraph determines under which
circumstances a case is considered as inadmissible. The second and
the third paragraphs of Article 17 provide guidelines on how to define
"unwillingness" and "inability".
Article 17, para. (1) provides for four different alternatives on which
the Court shall determine a case as inadmissible:
First, the case is being investigated or prosecuted by a state which
has jurisdiction over it, unless the state is unwilling or unable
genuinely to carry out the investigations or prosecution. Second, the
case has been investigated by a state, which has jurisdiction over it
and the state has decided not to prosecute the person concerned,
unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the
state genuinely to prosecute. Fourth, the person concerned has
already been tried for conduct which is the subject of the complaint,
and a trial by the Court is not permitted under Article 20, para. (3).
Fourth, the case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by
the Court.
In contrast to Article 12, the term "Court" is used in Article 17 in a
narrow sense, which means that the Office of the Prosecutor is not
included .164 However, Article 17 is of course an important guideline
for the Prosecutor in initiating an investigation or prosecution. First
the Prosecutor will have to determine that the case would be
admissible under Article 17.165 He/she shall notify all state parties that
163 McCormack, Robertson (supra 99) 645
164 Arsanjani (supra 129) 68
165 See: Art. 53 (1) (b) Statute of Rome
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an investigation has been initiated.166 From that moment until the
commencement of the trial the states can undertake steps to block
the investigation or prosecution.
At the commencement of the proceedings in every case the Court
must satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction.l'" It may act on its own
instance or on an objection to or challenge of its jurisdiction by an
accused person, a state that has jurisdiction over the case, the state
where the crime was committed, or the state of nationality of the
accusec.!" The only grounds on which the Court's jurisdiction may
be challenged is where a state, having jurisdiction, is exercising or
has exercised jurisdiction in the case, or that the ne bis in idem or
minimis non curat lex rules apply to the case.
Where a state that has jurisdiction claims that it is exercising or has
exercised jurisdiction in the case, the Court must defer to that state,
unless it is proven to its satisfaction that the state is unwilling or
unable to genuinely carry out the investigations or prosecunons.l'"
The first two alternatives of Article 17, para. (1) are combined with
exceptions. A case is inadmissible unless the investigation or
prosecution of that state, which has jurisdiction, is or was not affected
by "unwillingness" or "inability". To determine these exceptions Article
17 provides in para. (3) and (4) for certain guidelines.
166 See:Art. 18 (1) Statute of Rome
167 See: Art. 19 (1) Statute of Rome
168 See: Art. 19 (2) Statute of Rome
169 See: Art. 17 (1) (a), (b) Statute of Rome
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4.1 "Unwillingness" as an Exception to Inadmissibility
Article 17, para. (2) provides for guidelines to determine if a state is
unwilling genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution, or if
the decision not to prosecute the person concerned resulted from
unwillingness.
The difficulty during the creation of the Statute of finding a fitting
definition for "unwillingness" was that such a definition always would
directed at the national judicial systems. "[M]any delegations were
sensitive to the potential for the Court to function as a kind of court of
appeal, passing judgments on decisions and proceedings of national
judicial systems.'!" Hence, the problem was to find objective criteria
on which the Court should base its determination. To solve this
problem the phrase "in accordance with the norms of due process
recognized by international law" was added in the Chapeau of Article
17.171 "[I]t was thought that this paragraph, which dealt with
proceedings not being conducted impartially or independently, was
the natural place for including objective criteria,,172
Accordingly, in order to determine unwillingness the Court is
empowered to have regard to the principles of due process
recognised by international law. Central to these principles is fairness
to the accused person, who must be protected from "victor's justice",
and to the victims whose rights must be vindicated.173
170 Holmes (supra 144) 49
171 See: Art. 17 (2) Statute of Rome
172 Holmes (supra 144) 49
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The Court may also question the motive behind a state's decision to
initiate proceedings and determine whether this was done for the
purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal liability.174
The intention of a state to shield a person from criminal liability must
be devious.175 Therefore it might well be difficult for the Prosecutor to
prove this intent on the part of the state.
In situations where there have been unjustified delays in the
proceedings, the Court has to determine whether or not this is
evidence of a state's unwillingness to bring the person concerned to
justice.176To determine an unjustified delay in the proceedings seems
to be a difficult task. The Prosecutor must prove that the delay in the
proceedings is inconsistent with intent to bring the person concerned
to justice. Because of terms and deadlines in legal proceedings, it is
not unusual that a case can take years until the verdict is reached.
Moreover, the duration of proceedings can vary from country to
country. The question arises under which circumstances proceedings
suffer under an "unjustified delay" in the sense of Article 17, para (2)
(b). This provision does not limit the element "unjustified delay" only
to situations caused by authorities whose intention is to shield the
person concerned from criminal iiability. Due to the lack of such a
limitation (missing mental element = feh/endes subjektives
Tatbestandsmerkmal), the element "unjustified delay" could open the
possibility for the Court to exercise jurisdiction, although the domestic
criminal law systems are working genuinely. This does not
correspond with the notion of the principle of complementarity.
173 Morris Complementarity and Conflict: States, Victims, and the ICC in
Sewall, Karsen (eds) TheUnited States and the International Criminal Court
National Security and International Law (2000) 195-196
174 See: Art. 17 (2) (a) Statute of Rome
175 Williams (supra 137) 393
176 See: Art. 17 (2) (b) Statute of Rome
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Besides, the Court may also have to inquire into the independence
and impartiality of those that the state has entrusted with the conduct
of the proceedings and the manner which they have gone about their
tasks, both at the investigation and trial staqes.!" If under certain
circumstances there are grounds to suggest lack of transparency, the
appearance or likelihood of bias, or other factors to indicate real
partiality towards the accused, all this will be evidence that the Court
may use to pronounce on the state's unwillingness to genuinely bring
lawbreakers to justice. The lack of impartiality was originally put under
the heading of inability, in the sense that the state cannot provide an
impartial trial.178 But there might be defective proceedings, where the
trial is not a sham and the state usually provides an effective criminal
law system. Therefore the lack of impartiality was put under a
separate paragraph in Article 17.
It is difficult to define exactly the different provisions of Article 17,
para. (2). Even the newly published Commentary on the Rome
Statute 179 gives no clear definition under which circumstances a trial
is considered as impartial or the proceedings are initiated to shield a
person from criminal responsibility. It is necessary to wait until the
International Criminal Court starts its work and the first sentences
according to Article 17, para. (2) are delivered. Article 17, para. (2)
will certainly be an important keystone over which the defendants will
argue with the Prosecutor.
177 See: Art. 17 (2) (c) Statuteof Rome
178 Williams (supra 137)394
179 Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
Triffterer (ed) (1999)
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4.2 "Inability" as an Exception of Inadmissibility
In determining a state's inability to carry out the investigations or
prosecution, the Court may consider whether, due to a total or
substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the
state is unable to obtain the accused or the evidence or otherwise
unable to carry out its proceedings. This provision spelled out in
Article 17, para. (3) was enacted to take account of situations such as
that in Somalia, lacking a central government, or is in a state of chaos
because of a civil war, natural disasters or other events leading to
public disorder.18o
Wars or armed conflicts usually result in the substantial or total
collapse of judicial systems in the countries affected, justifying action
by the International Criminal Court. It is generally submitted that any
act or omission in the course of an investigation or trial that so falls
below the international minimum standard of justice as to result in
denial of justice should cast doubt on a state's genuine commitment
to bringing a suspect to justice.
It seems to be quite difficult for the Court to determine if a state is
unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and
testimony or otherwise is unable to carry out the proceedings
because of a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its
national judicial system. The International Criminal Court can
determine the admissibility of a case according to Article 17, para. (3),
if a state's legal and administrative structures have completely broken
down. The admissibility of a case in other situations must be achieved
in terms of Article 17, para. (2).
180 Arsanjani (supra 129) 70
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According to the wording of Article 17, para. (3), the inability to obtain
an accused or key evidence and testimony could be a result of the
partial or total collapse of a state's judicial system. During the
negotiations some delegations were concerned that combining these
two criteria could limit the Court's ability to act. The reason for these
concerns was that there might be cases where the evidence or the
accused are obtained carefully, but other aspects of the proceedings
are strongly affected by a substantial or total collapse. Due to these
concerns, the phrase "or otherwise unable to carry out its
proceedings" was added."!
Furthermore it can be said that the third alternative of Article 17, para.
(3), "unavailability of its national judicial system", is a general
provision that emphasises situations which do not fall under the first
two alternatives. This is because a national judicial system also
becomes unavailable if there is a total or substantial collapse,
affecting the acquisition of evidence, the accused and testimony.
4.3 Conflicts regarding "Unwillingness" and "Inability"
Because of the "Unwillingness" and "Inability" in Article 17, the
question of the burden of proof arises. The Statute doe's not give any
indications as to who has to provide the proof that a state is unwilling
or unable to carry out the prosecution or proceedings. Article 17, in
connection with the Preamble and Article 1, clearly suggests that the
drafters of the Statute had the intention that a state's jurisdiction
should take precedence over the jurisdiction of the International
181 Holmes (supra 144) 49
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Criminal Court, unless it can be shown that a state is unwilling or
unable to investigate or prosecute.
The person who alleges that a state is unwilling or unable to
investigate or prosecute must bear the burden of proof of this
assertion (is forced by the principle 'who alleges must prove'). It will
invariably be the Prosecutor in his efforts to assert the jurisdiction of
the International Criminal Court who must bear the burden of proof.
The difficulty of providing the proof that a state is unwilling or unable
to prosecute or investigate in a certain situation is obvious. This is
due to the fact that nearly all of the information about the status of the
state's law system, its proceedings and possibilities of investigation
and prosecution is in the hands of the state's authorities and not in
hands of the International Criminal Court's Prosecutor. Especially if
the suspects are officials, access to important information will be
blocked by the state and it has to wait until the International Criminal
Court starts its work to see if the Prosecutor ever will be able to bear
this burden effectively. The problem of gathering evidence by
international criminal institutions is not unknown.182 The difficulties of
the International Criminal Tribunals of the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda in gathering evidence emphasises obstacles the
International Criminal Court will have to overcome in the future and
the onerous burden of the Prosecutor in providing proof.
It was probably because of the lessons of the two ad hoc Criminal
Tribunals that, during the negotiations on the treaty, suggestions were
made that the burden of proof should partly be carried by the states.
However, it still would be much easier for the state, which holds all
182 Wapsi "Die Arbeit der Internationalen Strafgerichtshëfe fOr das
ehemalige Jugoslavien und Ruanda: Herausforderungen fOr die Anklage im
internationalen Umfeld" NJW 2000 2449-2453
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the information, to prove its willingness or ability than for the
Prosecutor to prove the contrary.
Another important point is that it is politically offensive to require the
Prosecutor to present affirmative and damaging evidence attacking a
state's judicial process or its good faith in instituting proceedings.
There has to be a strong and independent prosecutor, who in the
worst case is able to present evidence that, for instance, the United
States of America or France is unwilling or unable to carry out a
prosecution or investigation. It is no secret that the United States of
America finally signed the Statute of Rome due to the fact that, if the
International Criminal Court starts its work, the influence on the Court
in providing judges or prosecutors is easier for a state party than for a
non-party state.183
Another significant issue that is related to the "inability" of a state's
judicial system is the question of domestic penal legislation. If a state
does not have penal legislation over the crimes within the Court's
subject-matter jurisdiction, it won't be very difficult for the Intemational
Criminal Court to determine a case as admissible. This is because, if
a state has not criminalised the crimes spelled out in the Statute, it
cannot prosecute and therefore is with certainty "unable genuinely" to
carry out proceedings in the sense of Article 17.184 "[T]he Rome
Statute makes it clear that states' judicial authorities have the primary
responsibility of prosecuting and punishing international crimes. This
should be their normal task, and the ICC can only deal with cases
where national judicial systems do not prove to be up to this
assignment [...]".185
183 Scharf (supra 112)215
184 MacCormack,Robertson(supra 99) 645
185 Cassese (supra 151)158
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To avoid the International Criminal Court simply overriding the
domestic jurisdiction due to a lacuna in the domestic penal legislation,
the party states are eager to provide a domestic 'international criminal
code book' covering the crimes of the Statute before the Intemational
Criminal Court starts its work. Hence it can be said that the
complementary function of the International Criminal Court's
jurisdiction becomes an accelerator for the standard of international
criminal law at a domestic level.
Closely related to the issue of admissibility according to Article 17 is
the question of amnesties and pardons that states sometimes grant to
perpetrators for crimes within the International Criminal Court's
jurisdiction. The granting of such amnesties or pardons could render
a case before the International Criminal Court admissible. Although
the issue of amnesties and pardons was strongly discussed during
the negotiation in Rome, the Statute is silent on this point.186 Only
Article 53 with its broad range was intended to include complaints
about individuals who may have been exempt under amnesty law.187
However, Article 53 says nothing about the admissibility of a case if
there was an amnesty or pardon; it only emphasises under what
circumstances the Prosecutor can initiate an investigation.
In order to consider a case under Article 17 as admissible if there
were pardons and amnesties, it must be distinguished from the
situation where a state gives a blanket amnesty or if there was a
careful, prior investigation. This is because a blanket amnesty without
a prior investigation can already be seen as evidence of a state's
186 Holmes (supra 144) 77
187 Arsanjani (supra 129) 75
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unwillingness or inability in the sense of Article 17.188 No state has to
disclose the reasons for declining the prosecution of certain cases.
But if it does, the declining to prosecute must serve the interests of
peace and national reconclllatlon.l'"
The difficulty in judging if an amnesty or pardon makes a case
admissible is deciding where to draw the line between the sovereign
wisdom of a state in declining the prosecution and the abuse of
amnesty law. Nevertheless, the International Criminal Court should
take a flexible stance when dealing with such cases. It must try not to
encroach on the "mature" decision of a State in giving amnesty or
pardon and minimise the possibilities of abuse.
4.4 'Ne bis in idem' as a special Aspect of Inadmissibility
The principle of ne bis in idem is a result of the different ways of
applying national jurisdiction over crimes with a foreign element. Due
to the principle of territoriality, the active personality principle and the
principle of universality, criminals can be prosecuted and punished
twice by different sovereign states.190 To protect a person who has
already been prosecuted and punished by a court from being
prosecuted again and punished by another court, the internationally
recognised principle of ne bis in idem 191 prohibits such a scenario
under certain circumstances. Moreover, it also serves the interests of
judicial economy, as well by saving resources and court facilities.192
188 Nsereko (supra) 119
189 Nsereko (supra 153) 119
190 Oehler (supra 49) 458
191 Art. 14 of the International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights
reprinted in Brownlie Basic Documents in International Law (1995) 276-306
192 Tallgran Article 20 Ne bis in idem in Triffterer (ed) Commentary on the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999) 419-421
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The Statutes of the two ad hoc Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda had a great influence on the creation of the ne bis in
idem principle in the Statute of Rome. However, because of their
territorial and temporally limited jurisdiction and especially because of
the concurrent jurisdiction - with the possibility of primacy - Article 20
of the Statute became decisively different.193 Article 10, para. (2) (a)
of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia was also proposed and discussed by different delegations
as an exception to the ne bis in idem principle in the Statute of Rome,
but later completely deleted by the neqotlators.l'"
Article 17 para. (1) (c) provides the principle of ne bis in idem as a
reason to consider a case as inadmissible. A case should be
inadmissible where the person in question has already been tried for
the conduct that is the subject of the complaint and the Court is not
permitted under Article 20, para. (3).195 In principle a case is
inadmissible if the person concerned has already been tried by
another court for the same conduct. The exception is spelled out in
Article 20 para. (3) and can basically be seen as a safeguard
protecting the principle ne bis in idem from being abused.
Due to the fact that Article 17, para. (1) (c) refers to Article 20, para.
(3), the Court has to determine a case as admissible in respect of the
provision of Article 20, para. (3). The principle of ne bis in idem, as a
general principle of criminal law, became a special precondition of
admissibility in the Statute. This is why the principle is finally spelled
out under the second part of the Statute: "Jurisdiction, Admissibility
193 TalIgren (supra 192) 420
194 TalIgren (supra 192) 430
195 Williams (supra 137) 393
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and Applicable Law" .196 Actually, the right place for it would be part
three of the Statute: "General Principles of Criminal Law". The reason
for this 'unusual' location of the ne bis in idem principle lies in the
nature of complementarity. The national courts have primary
jurisdiction and the International Criminal Court is only allowed to
intervene if the standard set up by the Statute is not achieved by the
national judicial systems. This is what the complementarity is about.
The jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court was added to an
existing national jurisdictional system, and the relationship between
the national courts and the International Criminal Court is not
comparable to the relationship between the different national Courts.
For those reasons during the creation of the Statute the principle of
ne bis in idem was from early on closely linked to the issue of
jurisdiction and adrnissibility.l'" The principle of ne bis in idem can be
viewed as the last safegua_rdin allocating the tasks of national and
international criminal justice to the notion of complementarity.
4.4.1 The Preconditions of Article 20 para. (3) (a) and (b)
Pursuant to Article 17, para. (1) (c), a case can only be determined as
inadmissible by the Court if the precondition of the exception of the ne
bis in idem principle spelled out in Article 20, para (3) is not given.
Article 20, para (3) focuses on the "proceedings of another court". In
contrast to Article 20, para. (2) referring to "convicted or acquitted by
the Court", it would be sufficient according to Article 20, para (3) if
national authorities initiate a bona fide prosecution to bar the
International Criminal Court from determining a case admissible.
196 In the compilationof all the proposals,the principleof ne bis in idem
appears firstly as Article D under "GeneralPrinciplesof CriminalLawand
secondlyas Article42 underTrial.
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However, a national decision not to proceed because of insufficient
prosecution would not serve the interests of justice and therefore
would not be able to bar the Court's jurisdiction. This was referred to
as an interpretation in conformity with the notion of complementarity.
"[F]rom the wording of Article 20, para. (3) it is clear that such a
national decision, not amounting a conviction or acquittal, must be
subject to the same criteria the negligence of which will lead to the
application of the exception.,,198
Pursuant to Article 20, para. (3) (a), the accused person can be
prosecuted by the International Criminal Court if the proceedings in
the other court were for the purpose of "shielding that person from
criminal responsibility" for crimes within the jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court. The wording is partly the same as in
Article 17, para. (2) (a). This exception of the ne bis in idem principle
concerns mainly sham trails, for instance, for genocide, which is
finally charged as an assault.
Another exception to the principle of ne bis in idem is spelled out in
Article 20, para. (3) (b). Pursuant to that alternative, the ne bis in idem
must be denied if the proceedings were not conducted independently
or impartially in accordance with the norms of due process
recognised by international law. The wording of that paragraph is
similar to Article 17, para (2) (c). This alternative encompasses cases
where the proceedings are efficient and the prosecution proper.
However, the members of the Court have a present opinion of the
outcome of the trial.199
197 TalIgren (supra 192) 420
198 TalIgren (supra 192) 431
199 TalIgren (supra 192) 432
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The difference between Article 17, para. (2) (a) and (c) is that, in the
case of the latter, the accused person will be acquitted because of the
biased opinion of the judges, whereas in the situation of a sham trail
in the sense of Article 17, para. (2) (a), the accused person will be
charged, but the seriousness of the charge compared to the offence
is disproportionately small.
According to that exception of ne bis in idem an interesting question
is whether the opposite situation is also envisaged in this provision.
An example would be if a person was charged by a court for a crime
he did not commit, the proceedings were efficient but the outcome of
the case was the result of the biased opinion of the courts' members.
The question would be whether the International Criminal Court would
be able in such a situation to determine a case as admissible
according to Article 17, para (1) (c) in connection with Article 20, para
(3) (b). The wording of Article 20, para (3) (b) probably also encloses
this situation.
4.4.2 The relationship between Article 17, para. (2) and Article 20,
para. (3)
Article 20, para. (3) was the most controversial part of the ne bis in
idem principle. This is because it provides criteria judging the
standard of proceedings in a national trial. If the standard of the
proceedings on a national level does not correspond with the
provisions of Article 20, para. (3), the Court can determine a case as
admissible over Article 17, para. (1) (c). This includes an indication of
the primacy of the Intemational Criminal Court. Article 17 does the
same. As has already been mentioned, the wording of Article 20,
para. (3) (a) and (b) is nearly identical to the wording of Article 17,
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para. (2) (a) and (c). The question is if there can be situations where
the case is taken over by the International Criminal Court because of
Article 17, para. (1) (c) in accordance with Article 20, para. (3) (a)
and/or (b).
It can be said that because of the general character of ne bis in idem
and because of the position in the context of Article 17, that Article
17, para. (1) (c) steps behind (subsidiar) Article 17, para. (1) (a) and
(b). Accordingly, the Court firstly has to look if a case is inadmissible
pursuant to Article 17, para. (1) (a) and (b) and examine its
exceptions. If the Court comes to the conclusion that the case is
inadmissible, then there might be the possibility to achieve
admissibility in terms of Article 17, para. (1) (c) in accordance with
Article 20, para. (3) (a) and (b). However, due to the fact that the
wording of the definition of "unwillingness" in Article 17, para. (2) (a)
and (c) and Article 20, para. (3) (a) and (b) is similar, every case
which is determined as inadmissible pursuant to Article 17, para. (1)
(a) and (b) cannot become admissible over the exceptions of ne bis in
idem. It can only become admissible if the trial was held before the
Statute came into force. However, in such cases the Court does not
have jurisdiction because of Article 11, para. (1) and (2).
4.5 Sufficient Gravity of a Case
The fourth and the final ground on which the International Criminal
Court has to determine if a case is admissible or not is the gravity of
the case. According to this paragraph, one has to refer to the
preamble, para. 3 and 4.200 The notion of complementarity entails that
only the most serious crimes of concern to the international
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community can be punished by the International Criminal Court.
Article 17, para. (1) (d) therefore intends to underpin the Preamble
and Article 1 in accordance with Article 5 because, if the crime in
question is not one of the most serious crimes of international
concern, spelled out in Article 5, the Court would not have jurisdiction
and the question of admissibility would never be elevated by the
Court.
Moreover, the term "sufficient gravity" ensures that the International
Criminal Court's interest in investigation and prosecution is limited to
those perpetrators who bear the greatest responsibility for atrocities.
These are military and other leaders.201
"[I]ts placement here as an admissibility issue maintains the
distinction between justiciability under articles 5 through 9,
and the Court's exercise of jurisdiction as a policy matter
(although complementarity jurisdiction per se does not
directly address the question of the Court's choice whom to
prosecute from among defendants).,,202
5 Preliminary Ruling on Admissibility at Initiation of a Case
The preliminary rulings of the Statute203 regarding admissibility is a
reinforcement of the principle of complementarity and furthermore a
result of the primacy of the national courtS.204
200Williams (supra 137) 393
201Phillips "The international Criminal Court Statute: Jurisdiction and
Admissibility" ClF 199962-78
202Phillips (supra 201) 78
203See: Art. 18Statute of Rome
204Arsanjani (supra 129) 70
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5.1 The Purpose and Scope of Article 18
Article 18 serves different purposes. Firstly, it emphasises that the
state parties have the right and duty to investigate and prosecute
crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.
Article 18 therefore underlines the right of the parties to the Statute to
act in the first place.205Secondly, it enables the states to use their
rights in a practical sense and to fulfil their duties properly without any
interference from the International Criminal Court. Thirdly, the
provision restrains an overly zealous Prosecutor and ensures that
he/she is accountable for his/her actions to some superior
authority.206This is necessary because of the independent position of
the Office of the Prosecutor in the composition of the International
Criminal Court and because of his/her proprio motu powers. Fourthly,
due to the early involvement of the Pre-Trial Chamber, the Prosecutor
is protected from "[u]nfounded accusations of bias and from political
manipulations on the part of some powerful states".207
The Prosecutor has to comply the provisions of Article 18 only if the
referral to investigate a certain situation was initiated either by a state
party pursuant to Article 13, para. (a) or if the Prosecutor acts on
his/her own motion (proprio muto) pursuant to Article 13, para. (c) in
connection with Article 15. If a situation is referred to the Prosecutor
by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations, Article 18 is not to be applied. Due to the fact that the
Security Council of the United Nations has primacy in matters
involving international peace and security, there is no need for further
205 Nsereko Article 18Preliminary rulings regarding admissibility in Triffterer
(ed) Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
~1999) 395-397
06 Arsanjani (supra 129) 70
207 Nsereko (supra 205) 397
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authorisation from the Pre-Trial Chamber. The decisions of the
Security Council bind all states. Judicial repression is one of the
measures of the Security Council to keep or restore intemational
peace and security.208
If a situation is referred to the Prosecutor by a state and the
Prosecutor has to determine that there is a reasonable basis to
commence an investigation, or the Prosecutor is acting propio motu,
he/she has to notify all state parties. Besides this, the Prosecutor has
to inform those states which would normally exercise jurisdiction over
the crimes concerned. The Prosecutor has the right to inform states
on a confidential basis and limit the information provided to them, if it
is necessary "to protect persons, prevent destruction of evidence or
prevent the absconding of persons".
To commence the investigation the Prosecutor needs a reasonable
basis. Therefore, a state that referred a situation to the Prosecutor
must also provide credible information to support him/her in
determining whether there is indeed substance in the allegations,
justifying further action by the Prosecutor.209
Within one month after the state has received notification of the
commencement of investigation, the state may inform the Court that it
is investigating or has investigated the crimes concerned. Moreover,
that state can request the Prosecutor to defer to the state's
investigation. Due to the principle of complementarity, the "request" in
Article 18, para. (2) is more a demand than a request."? If the state
does not respond to the notification or does not use its right to
208 Nsereko (supra 205) 398
209 Nsereko(supra 205) 399
210 Nsereko (supra 205) 401
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request the deferral, the Prosecutor may go ahead with his/her
investigation.
In the case of a request to defer the investigation to the state's
authorities, the Prosecutor can request the Pre-Trial Chamber to
authorise further investigation.
The ruling of the Pre-Trial Chamber regarding the deferral of a case
may be appealed to the Appeals Chamber either by the Prosecutor or
the state against which the ruling is made. Such an appeal shall be
heard on an expedited basis in accordance with Article 82. An appeal
by a state against a preliminary ruling of the Pre-Trial Chamber under
Article 18, does not preclude the right of that state to challenge the
admissibility of a case on the basis of additional significant facts or
change of clrcumstences.ê"
If the Prosecutor defers the investigation to the requesting state,
Article 18, para. (3) and (5) gives him/her measures to control the
proceedings of the state's investigation.
5.2 The Obligation to Notify Third States
According to the notification pursuant to Article 18, para. (1), the
question arises if the Prosecutor is also obliged to inform non-party
states. The answer to that question partly depends on the clarification
of the term "and those States which, [...] would normally exercise
jurisdiction over the crimes concerned". A possible construction of the
clause would depend on the use of the term "and" in Article 18 para.
(1). If it is understood in a restrictive way, the notification could be
211 Asanjani (supra 129) 71
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limited only to those state parties, which would normally exercise
jurisdiction_212
However, this construction has to be rejected due to the possibility of
third states, pursuant to Article 12, para. (3), declaring ad hoc the
acceptance of the International Criminal Court's jurisdiction. If such
an ad hoc declaration is involved, the Prosecutor must obviously
notify that state about the commencement of the investigation. The
Prosecutor, however, would only be obliged to inform a non-party
state if the term "and" is understood in an additive and not in a
restrictive sense.
Moreover, the wording of Article 18, para. (1) seems to include the
obligation of the Prosecutor to notify third states if they, "would
normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes concerned". By reason
of the Prosecutor's duty to inform all state parties pursuant to the first
alternative, the second altemative to notify states which "would
normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes concerned" would be
superfluous if only state parties should be informed. The obligation of
the Prosecutor to notify state parties is already contained in the first
alternative.
The purpose of Article 18 is to reinforce the principle of
complementarity and to control the Prosecutor. According to non-
party states, there is no need to reinforce the principle of
complementarity or to control the Prosecutor due to the fact that the
Statute does not oblige non-party states and the jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court normally does not stand in concurrence
or any relationship to the national court's jurisdiction of non-party
212 Nsereko (supra 205) 399
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states. Only in the case of "jurisdiction over nationals of a non-party
state,,213is the relationship between national courts of non-party
states and the International Criminal Court in question.
Moreover, the clarification of Article 18, para. (5) might emphasise the
fact that a notification of a non-party state is not necessary, because
it makes certain that only "States Parties shall respond to such
requests without undue delay". If non-party states were included, the
provision of Article 18, para. (5) would also provide an alternative for
those states which are not a party to the Statute.214However, the
Statute of Rome is also a multilateral international treaty.215Hence, it
cannot bind or oblige states which did not become a party to the
Statute. A clause that obliges a non-party state would be ineffectual
pursuant to the principles of international law treaties.
In conclusion, it can be said, that the Prosecutor is only obliged to
notify third states about the commencement of the investigation in two
different cases: first, when the Prosecutor investigates against a
national of a non-party state, who committed a crime on the territory
of a party state; Secondly, when a third state declares the acceptance
of the International Criminal Court's jurisdiction ad hoc and the
investigation is aimed against a national of such a state. In both
cases, the third state would normally, due to the active personality
principle, exercise its jurisdiction.
213 See: ChapterTwo, 3.2.5
214 Nsereko (supra 205) 399
215 Cassese (supra 151) 145
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5.3 The Authorization of the Pre-Trial Chamber
The Statute provides in Article 18 that there are no grounds on which
the Pre-Trial Chamber can authorise further action by the Prosecutor
if the state concerned requested a deferral of the investigation. The
question is under which circumstances the Pre-Trial Chamber can
authorise the Prosecutor to proceed with the investigation, although
the state has requested a deferral.
The principle of complementarity is a fundamental feature of the
International Criminal Court and cannot be overridden by the Pre-Trial
Chamber. Hence, the question arises whether the provisions of
Article 17 have to be applied by the Pre-Trial Chamber regarding the
authorisation of the Prosecutor's investigation in the case of a
deferral. Due to the primacy of national jurisdiction and the non-
intention of the International Criminal Court of encroaching on the
sovereignty of the state party, the preconditions for authorising further
action by the Prosecutor must be as restrictive as the preconditions
for admissibility.
However, it also has to be considered that the investigation, as the
first step towards a trial, must be flexible to be effective. The
suspicion of a situation (begrOndeter Tatverdacht) mentioned in
Article 17 must be sufficient to commence with an investigation. If the
grounds on which the Pre-Trial Chamber can authorise further action
by the Prosecutor were as restrictive as in Article 17, the risk of a
Prosecutor becoming functionally paralysed would be dangerously
high. The two contrary interests - on the one hand, the primacy of
national jurisdiction and, on the other hand, the effectiveness of
investigation and prosecution - have to be brought into accord.
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Hence, according to the authorisation of the Pre-Trail Chamber, the
provisions of Article 17 have not to be applied in the restrictive way
that the Court has to apply them in determining a case as admissible.
Nevertheless, the basic idea (Auslegungsregel of Article 18, para (2))
of Article 17 has always been considered by the Pre-Trial Chamber
as authorising the Prosecutor to commence with the investigation.
6 Challenges to the Jurisdiction of the ICC and Admissibility of a
Case
The preconditions of how and by whom the jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court or the admissibility of a case can be
challenged are addressed in Article 19. Pursuant to Article 19, para.
(1), the Court shall satisfy itself that is has jurisdiction in any case
brought before it and mayan its own motion determine if a case is
admissible in accordance with Article 17.
The term "case" in Article 19, para. (1) is to be understood in a more
narrow sense than the term "situation" in the Articles 13, 14 and 18.
"[T]he concept of a 'case' would seem to imply that an individual or
individuals had been or were targeted as the result of an investigation
of a 'situation'. ,,216
The fact that the duty of the Court to satisfy itself that it has
jurisdiction is limited on cases "brought before it" is striking. According
to the determination of admissibility in Article 19, para.(1), such a
limitation is failing. This leads to the conclusion that the Court can
216 Hall Article 19 Challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court or the
admissibility of a case in Triffterer (ed) Commentary on the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court (1999) 406-407
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theoretically determine if the case is admissible in accordance with
Article 17 in advance and is not obliged to wait until the case is
brought before it. However, the Court normally would wait until the
admissibility is challenged in order to determine if a case is
admissible or not.211 The fact that the challenges to the jurisdiction of
the Court and the admissibility of a case are codified in the same
article of the Rome Statute emphasises the close relationship
between admissibility and jurisdiction and how both features melt
together in the principle of complementarity.
6.1 The Right to make Challenges
Article 19, para. (2) provides for the provisions of who can challenge
the Court's jurisdiction and/or the admissibility of a case. Pursuant to
that provision, the Court's jurisdiction and/or the admissibility of a
case can be challenged either by the accused or the person under a
warrant of arrest or summons to appear before the Court.
Furthermore, a challenge can be mounted by a state that has
jurisdiction over a case on the ground that it is investigating or
prosecuting or already has investigated or prosecuted. Finally, a
challenge can be mounted by a state whose acceptance of the
Court's jurisdiction is required as a precondition for the Court to
exercise jurisdiction under Article 12.
The burden of proof according to the challenge to jurisdiction or
inadmissibility has to be carried by the challenging state or individual.
This is as it should be due to the fact that the states, in principle, are
advent to the necessary information.218
217 Hall (supra 216) 408
218 Hall (supra 216) 409
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6.1.1 Challenges to Admissibility
The fact that a state has already challenged the admissibility of an
investigation under Article 18 and this challenge was rejected by the
Pre-Trial Chamber does not lead to an inability to challenge the
admissibility of the case again under Article 19. However, in such a
case Article 18, para (7) requires additional significant facts or a
significant change of circumstances to justify another challenge under
Article 19.
Under Article 19, the admissibility of a case can only be challenged
on the grounds mentioned in Article 17. The striking difference
between Article 18, para. (2) and a challenge to the admissibility of a
case under Article 19, is that Article 18, para. (2) does not list the
grounds on which the Pre-Trial Chamber can authorise further action
by the Prosecutor.219
If Article 18, para (7) is interpreted as a requiring preliminary provision
for a state, in order to mount a challenge under Article 19, then states
are essentially precluded from contesting a Security Council referral
under Article 19. If Article 18 para. (7) is read limited to a state's
access to a repeated challenge then this is not the case. Regardless
of one's interpretation of Article 18, para. (7), there are no provisions
for a state to challenge the Prosecutor's investigation of a Security
Council referred situation on admissibility grounds. It would appear
under Article 19 that a state may only challenge such a referral at the
stage where a case had been brought.
219 See: Chapter Three, 5.3
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6.1.2Challenges to Jurisdiction
Due to the fact that "jurisdiction" is not defined in Article 19, the range
of the term "jurisdiction" is in question. Pursuant to Article 19, para.
(1) the Court shall satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction. This implies that
the Court itself is also empowered to define the range of "jurisdiction".
Without doubt the jurisdictional issues spelled out in the Statute are
covered by this term. Hence the jurisdiction ratione loci, ratione
materiae, ratione personae and ratione temporis are grounds on
which a challenge can be made.
However, the question arises whether the validity of the International
Criminal Court's establishment and its competence are a part of the
term "jurisdiction" and can therefore also be challenged under Article
19. To grant the highest standard of fairness, 'jurisdiction', especially
in international law, must be understood in a broad sense. In the case
Prosecutor versus Tadic, the Appeals Chamber stated:
"[A] narrow concept of jurisdiction may, perhaps, be
warranted in a national context but not in international law.
International law, because it lacks a centralized structure,
does not provide for an integrated judicial system operating
an orderly division of labour among a number of tribunals,
where certain aspects or components of jurisdiction as a
power could be centralized in one of them but not in the
others. In international law, every tribunal is a self contained-
system [...]. This is incompatible with a narrow concept of
jurisdiction, which presupposes a certain division of labour.
Of course, the constitutive instrument of an international
tribunal can limit some of its jurisdictional powers, but only to
the extent to which such limitations does not jeopardize its
'judicial character' [...]. Such limitations cannot, however, be
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presumed and, in any case, they cannot be deduced from
the concept of jurisdiction itself. ,,220
According to the opinion of the Appeals Chamber of the International
Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia, the establishment and
the competence of an international criminal institution falls under the
term jurisdiction and hence can also be challenged. However, one
has to wait until the International Criminal Court starts its work to see
whether the International Criminal Court would follow the opinion of
the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia.
6.1.3 Challenge by the Accused or a Sought Person
Pursuant to Article 19, para. (2) (a) a challenge can be mounted by
an "accused". The Statute does not provide a definition for the term
"accused" but "[i]t would be consistent with the structure of the
Statute and the approach of the Ru/es of Procedure an Evidence of
the /CTY and /CrR to define an accused for the purposes of Article
19 as a person identified in 'the document containing the charges'
referred to in article 61 para. 3 (a), as of the moment the document is
provided to the Pre-Trial Chamber, whether in camera pursuant to a
sealed indictment or publicly, rather than at the stage the charges are
confirmed in accordance with article 61 para. 7 (a), and to consider
the person as an accused under the Statute until the charges are not
confirmed or the person is acquitted or convtcted."?"
220 Prosecutor v. Tadic (Case No. IT-94-1-AR72) (supra 79) 39
221 Hall (supra216) 409
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As for an accused, Article 19 provides the right to mount a challenge
for a person for whom a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear
has been issued under Article 58. A person for whom a warrant of
arrest is issued by the Pre-Trial Chamber is, pursuant to Article 58,
para. (1), a person for whom there are reasonable grounds to believe
that he/she committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court and
the arrest of that person appears necessary. A person for whom a
summons is issued by the Pre-Trial Chamber is in accordance with
Article 58, para. (7) somebody where a warrant of arrest is not
necessary to ensure the appearance of that person before the Court.
In contrast to Article 18, individuals are empowered under Article 19
to mount challenges. Article 18 enables only states to challenge the
admissibility of the Prosecutor's investigation, whereas Article 19
provides the means also to the accused or sought person and not
only to states. This emphasises that Article 18, para. (7) cannot be
read as a preliminary ruling for a challenge under Article 19. But in
view of the principle of judicial economy (Prozel3okonomie) and wide
effective judicial protection (effecfiver Rechfsschufz), it is
questionable why the person mentioned in Article 19, para (2) (a) is
not empowered to challenge the investigation of the Prosecutor.
A state's challenge to the investigation of the Prosecutor under Article
18 concerns the validity of the investigation. Therefore, states have
the possibility to influence the proceedings before a "situation"
becomes a "case". If a "situation" has already become a "case", the
validity of any act of the Prosecutor cannot be affected anymore.222
Hence the person concerned has no measures to act against the
Prosecutor's investigation.
222 See:Art. 19 (9) Statute of Rome
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However, recalling the fact that Article 18 deals with "situations" and
Article 19 with "cases", it lies in the nature of the different stages of
the procedure that at the time where the admissibility of an
investigation can be challenged under Article 18, no accused or
sought person in the sense of Article 19 is involved. The fact that the
Statute actually provides states with two rights to challenge the
admissibility of a "case" and/or "situation", and only one possibility for
the person concerned to challenge only the admissibility of a "case",
ensues from the principle of complementarity and from the Statute as
an international multilateral treaty.
Article 18 enforces the principle of complementarity and therefore
concerns states more than individuals. However, it theoretically opens
the possibility that an inadmissible investigation can be lead against
the person concerned without giving that person any legal right to
protect himself against such a situation. This problem does not arise
as long as the investigation proceeds secretly, but as soon as it
becomes public an investigation by the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court can damage anybody's reputation. Especially during
struggles for political power in unstable countries, the initiation of an
investigation can be used as a political measure against the
opponent.
6.1.4 Challenge by a State with Jurisdiction
Pursuant to Article 19, para. (2) (b) a state which has jurisdiction over
a case can mount a challenge to the Court's jurisdiction or to the
admissibility of a case on the grounds that it is investigating or
prosecuting or has already investigated or prosecuted the crime
concerned. Since all states are empowered under international law
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due to the principle of universality to potentially apply their jurisdiction
over the crimes within the International Criminal Court's jurisdiction, it
is likely that Article 19, para. (2) (b) meant only to include those states
which had provided their own courts with jurisdiction under national
law over the case whether under the principle of territoriality, the
active or passive personality principle or the principle of
universal ity.223
Article 19, para. (2) (b) can be read so that it limits the grounds on
which a challenge can be mounted by a state on the basis that the
state is investigating or prosecuting or already has investigated or
prosecuted. This could mean that pursuant to that provision only
challenges to the admissibility of a case and not to the jurisdiction of
the Court can be made by states which have jurisdiction. However,
the Chapeau of that provision emphasises that challenges can be
made to the jurisdiction of the Court or to the admissibility of a case. It
could depend on the clause "to the admissibility of a case [...] or
challenges to the jurisdiction" if the states mentioned in Article 19,
para. (2) (b) are limited to challenges only to the admissibility of a
case. The "or" can be understood exclusively, in the sense of
'either/or' but also inclusively in the sense of 'or/and'. According to
Article 19 para. (2) (b) the "or" in the Chapeau must also be read in
the sense of 'or/and'. This is because subparagraphs (a) and (b) of
that provision do not include any limitations and allow both kinds of
challenges. A state which has jurisdiction is also able to challenge the
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. If the intention of
Article 19, para. (2) (b) would be to limit the challenges of a state
which has jurisdiction only to the admissibility of a case, then the
Chapeau of para. (2) would not include the possibility of challenges to
223 Hall (supra 216) 410
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the admissibility and to the jurisdiction. Para. (2) as Chapeau for the
subparagraphs (a) through (c) is part of every subparagraph and
must be read together with them.
It is also conceivable that the limitation in Article 19, para. (2) (b) does
not refer to the basis of the challenges, but simply intends to limit the
right to challenge to those states which are investigating or
prosecuting or has investigated or prosecuted the crime
concerned.F" This seems to be the right interpretation as there is no
reason for the Statute to limit the challenges of states which have
jurisdiction only to those concerning the admissibility. However, states
could obtain in an underhand way the right to challenge due to the
fact that it is easy for a state to initiate an investigation. The right to
challenge could be abused to sabotage the proceedings of the
International Criminal Court.
6.1.5 Challenge by a State whose Acceptance of Jurisdiction is
required
Finally, Article 19, para. (2) (c) emphasises that states from which the
acceptance of jurisdiction is required under Article 12 have the right to
challenge the court's jurisdiction or the admissibility of a case.
However, if a situation is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security
Council pursuant to Article 13, para. (b), the state's acceptance of
jurisdiction is not required. Consequently, a case can never be
challenged under Article 19, para. (2) (c) if the referral to initiate an
investigation comes from the Security Council.
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Pursuant to Article 12, the acceptance of jurisdiction is required of the
state on which territory (including aircraft and vessels) the crime was
committed or the state of nationality. These are the states which can
challenge the admissibility of a case or the Court's jurisdiction under
Article 19, para. (2) (c).
It is notable that neither Article 19, para. (2) (b) nor (c) limits the right
of challenges to party states. Hence, non-party states can, if they fulfil
the preconditions of these provisions, mount a challenge to the
jurisdiction or admissibility.
6.2 General Remarks according to the Challenges
The persons or states mentioned in Article 19, para. (2) may make
challenges to the admissibility or jurisdiction, in principle, only once
and prior to or at the commencement of the trial. Challenges to the
admissibility of a case may be brought with the leave of the Court at a
later stage on the ground that the person concerned has already
been tried for the same conduct and the Court is barred under the
principle of ne bis in idem contained in Article 20, para. (3) from trying
the person again.
Prior to the confirmation of charges, the Pre-Trial Chamber will
address the challenges to admissibility or jurisdiction of the Court.
Otherwise, the Trial Chamber will deal with them. Decisions regarding
admissibility or jurisdiction may be appealed to the Appeals Chamber.
If the challenge is made by a state, the Prosecutor is obliged to
suspend investigation until the Court has made a decision on the
224 Hall (supra 216) 411
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matter in accordance with Article 17, which deals exclusively with
admissibility.
- 105-
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Conclusion
The birth of the International Criminal Court was not an easy on in
view of all the historical events and the controversial academic
debates influencing the Statute of Rome. A lot of work on a political
and academic level was necessary to enable the community of
nations to establish a permanent international criminal institution as it
is now codified in the Statute of Rome. The Statute of Rome presents
in many ways a compromise between the negotiating states due to
the fact that, on the one hand, it spells out the material and
procedural law for the International Criminal Court and, on the other
hand, represents a multilateral international treaty. Like every statute,
this one has strengths and weaknesses; however, it is a great step
towards justice and a great step forward in the development of
international criminal law. The problems around the jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court have largely been described throughout
this research. Many of these problems will maybe be solved as soon
as the Judges of the International Criminal Court have given their first
verdict. The discussions and debates according to the Statute of the
International Criminal Court, which can be found in books, journals
and commentaries, are more or less just academic. How efficient the
Statute will be in bringing international perpetrators to justice remains
to be seen once the Court starts its work. Especially for an institution
working on an international level, the difference between theoretical
concept and practical realisation can be enormous and the influence
of issues and matters which have nothing to do with justice cannot be
underestimated. The higher the level on which a legal question
occurs, the more political becomes the solution. However, it has to be
mentioned that it is almost a miracle that the international community,
fifty-six years after the last world war, has managed to establish an
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international institution which is able and has the means to secure
peace in bringing perpetrators to justice.
Regarding the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, the
Statute has several weaknesses. Firstly there is the complicated
structure of Article 12 in accordance with Article 13 and the fact that
the Court strongly depends on the Security Council, especially if core
crimes are committed on the territory of non-party states. Secondly,
there is the fact that the International Criminal Court is unable to
apply the widely accepted principle of universality. Thirdly, the Statute
does not give a solution on how to deal with international obligations
between state parties and third states. Fourthly, there is the imprecise
relationship between Article 12 and Article 11, as it is silent on the
point whether the Court shall have jurisdiction over crimes committed
on the territory of a state party by a national of a state for which the
Statute is not in force. Finally, there is the Transnational Provision as
a possibility for state parties to opt-out of the Court's jurisdiction with
reference to war crimes.
The structure of Article 12, which spells out the preconditions to
exercise the jurisdiction of the Court, is far from being perfect. Its
relationship to Article 13 is complicated as the preconditions of Article
12 are not necessary if a situation is referred to the Prosecutor by the
Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations. Article 13, para. (b) is the strongest means of the Statute as
it does not require the acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction by any
state involved. However, the referral must be adopted by the Security
Council in a resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations and therefore is subject to the exercise of the veto power of
the permanent members of the Security Council. This emphasises the
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strong dependence of the International Criminal Court on the Security
Council.
The referral of a situation under Article 13 para (a) by a state party
requires the acceptance of either the state of nationality or the
territorial state. The difficulty is that this can lead to political and
diplomatic ramifications if a state party refers a situation to the Court,
stating that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court was committed
on the territory or by a national of another state. The question for the
future work of the International Criminal Court therefore is, if the state
parties excessively use their right to refer situations, occurring in
other states, to the Court.
The Statute is further unclear with reference to the exercise of
jurisdiction in relation to non-party states. The problem is that the
International Criminal Court is not able to apply universal jurisdiction
leads to some difficulties in how the jurisdiction over a national of a
non-party state can be justified. As Article 12 clearly rejects universal
jurisdiction, jurisdiction over a national of a non-party state who
committed a crime on the territory of a state party can only be justified
on the basis of the delegation of territorial jurisdictional power to the
International Criminal Court. Accordingly, the International Criminal
Court in such cases acts in the name of the party state on which
territory the alleged crime was committed.
The opt-out clause for war crimes in Article 124 was added to the
Statute at the very last stage of the negotiations in Rome, but finally
helped to gain the support of the majority of the participating states.
However, pursuant to that provision the International Criminal Court
cannot exercise its jurisdiction over war crimes committed in a period
of seven years if the territorial state or state of nationality opted out
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under Article 124. The only way to mount such a case before the
International Criminal Court is for the Security Council to refer the
situation to the Court. This shows again that the International Criminal
Court strongly depends on the Security Council.
The main strength of the Statute according to the exercise of
jurisdiction is the achievement of a strong Prosecutor, who is able to
initiate investigations on his/her own motion. Although the acceptance
of the state of nationality or of the territorial state is necessary if the
Prosecutor initiates an investigation proprio motu and the
commencement of the investigation depends on the decision of the
Pre-Trial Chamber, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court
has effective means to fulfil his/her tasks. Besides, with the controlling
mechanism of Article 15, the participating states guaranteed once
again the successful adoption of the Statute. Notably, there is no
specification as to the source of information used by the Prosecutor to
exercise his/her prerogative. This opens the door for an active role for
other United Nations organs, international organisations and non-
governmental organisations.
The principle of complementarity is one of the cornerstones on which
the Statute of Rome is built. The admissibility of cases before the
International Criminal Court depends on the question as to whether
the Court is allowed in certain situations to complement the national
jurisdiction. It was never the intention of the negotiators in Rome to
create a supra-agency for international crimes. The International
Criminal Court is intended only to complement national judicial
systems. One of the most positive effects trigged by the principle of
complementarity is that national judicial systems are indirectly forced
to raise the standard of their substantive and procedural criminal law
to an intemational level regarding the prosecution of core crimes. The
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principle of complementarity can therefore be seen as an effective
means to eliminate lacuna regarding core crimes on an international
level. In providing the principle of complementarity the Statute of
Rome takes into account that prosecution at national level is often the
better solution regarding judicial efficiency and justice. This is
because the gathering of evidence at the locus delicti seems to be
more effective and the language differences are usually limited.
Furthermore, the danger that the International Criminal Court is
flooded with cases and becomes paralysed is minimised, as national
courts will take over most of the cases.
Pursuant to Article 17 a case is admissible if national courts are
unable or unwilling to act, the person concerned already has been
tried or the case is not of sufficient gravity. Although Article 17, para
(2) and (3) provide for guidelines on how to determine "inability" or
"unwillingness", the definitions are not clear and the danger of abuse
is high. Especially the fact that the burden of proof has to be carried
normally by the Prosecutor is a weakness of the Statute. The crimes
within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court are mainly
committed by or with the assistance of state authorities. But these are
the persons who in principle hold all the information about the status
and standards of the judicial system of the state concerned. It will be
difficult for the Prosecutor to prove the "inability" or "unwillingness" of
a state if the crime was committed by or under the auspices of that
state's authorities.
The same difficulty occurs under the principle ne bis in idem. The
Prosecutor has in principle to prove that the trial was a sham or
initiated to shield the person from criminal responsibility, although the
person concerned may be an authority normally with access to all key
information. Furthermore, it is unclear, according to the principle of
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ne bis in idem, how Article 17, para (2) and Article 20, para (3) relate
to one another. Due to the similar wording of these two provisions,
the question arises if a case can be considered as admissible under
the principle of ne bis in idem or if all cases are already covered
under Article 17, para (2) and Article 20, para (3) therefore becomes
superfIuous.
Another weakness closely related to the admissibility of a case is that
the Statute is silent on the point of how to deal with pardons and
amnesties. One will have to must wait and see how the International
Criminal Court will apply the Statute on pardons and amnesties.
According to Article 18, it is unclear if the Prosecutor has to notify
third states about the commencement of the proceedings. However, if
a state declares ad hoc that it accepts the jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court, the Prosecutor is obliged to notify this
state. Furthermore, if the Court exercises its jurisdiction over a
national of a non-party state, a notification is a precondition to
commence with the proceedings. Another obscurity has to do with the
circumstances under which the Pre-Trial Chamber can authorise
further steps of the Prosecutor if a state requests a deferral of the
investigation. Obviously Article 17 will be a guideline for the Pre-Trail
Chamber to decide in such a case.
According to Article 19, which deals with the question of challenges to
the jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of a case, it is
notable that the Court can determine the admissibility of a case in
advance. The Court does not have to wait until the case is brought
before it. In contrast, the determination of the Court's jurisdiction over
a case is limited to cases brought before the Court. However, in
respect of judicial efficiency, the Court will wait in both situations until
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one of them is challenged in order to determine if it has jurisdiction or
a case is admissible.
In view of all the weaknesses and strengths of the Statute of Rome, it
can be said that the International Criminal Court has the necessary
means to fulfil its tasks and to work according to the ideals expressed
in the Preamble. However, it is an international institution which
strongly depends on the support of the different nations. Hopefully the
Statute will gain more parties and the state parties will recognise that
the Statute of Rome and its International Criminal Court represents
an enormous possibility for the entire world community to replace
war, atrocities and injustice with peace and justice.
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~ppendix
. The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court
International Art. 126 {ili Art. 125
Criminal The International Criminal Court comes into legal existence on the National
Court (ICC) first day of the month after the 60th day following the date of the Courts
deposit of the so" instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or
1/ accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations Before the". ... ... International
The validity of the Art. 19 (!ara. {i1 Criminal Court
International Criminal The Court shall satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case comes into legal
Court is an aspect of brought before it. existence, the
the Court's jurisdiction The Court may on its own motion determine the admissibility of a crimes spelled out
(Prosecutor v. Tadic) case in accordance with article 17 in Art. 5 fall under
the jurisdiction of
". national courts.
(International
..... The International Criminal Court shall satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction Criminal
Tribunals)
.~ ... ... ".
The International Jurisdiction Jurisdiction Jurisdiction Jurisdiction I
Criminal Court ratione ratione materie ratione loci ratione National Courts
Principle of
temporis personae
". ". Y. ... After the Statute
Complementarity
Art. 11 Rara.(1) Art. 5 Rara.(1) comes into force,
Jurisdiction only Jurisdictiononly Art.12 national courtsThe ICC complements over crimes over crimes The ICC can exercise its jurisdiction if have primarythe national courts committed after the spelled out in Art. either the Sate of nationality (Art. 12 (2) jurisdiction but are
Statute comes into 5 (b» or the territorial State (Art. 12 (2) (a» complemented by
A. .J\. force has accepted the Court's jurisdiction (~ the ICC... -y 1) Acceptance by becominga State r-v
Art. 11 Rara.(2) Art.124 party: Art. 125, 126 (1)(2), 12 (1)
Jurisdiction only Opt-out provision 2) Acceptance by ad hoc declaration:
over crimes for war crimes Art 12 (3)
committed after the Exception:Art. 13 (b) No acceptance
entry into force of necessary if the SecurityCouncil refers a
the Statute for that situation to the Prosecutor
State
~Jan Denecke
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I. The Rei, .,--- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - -- - -- - --- -------- ------
The Principle of Complementarity
Jl Jl
Art. 19 {1} The International Criminal
National Courts The ICC mayan its own motion determine if a case is admissible Court
The principle of
... ... The standard of "unwillingness":
complementarity forces the Art.17 (1}{a} Art.17 (1} (a} 1) Art.17 (2) (a)
A case is inadmissible if A case becomes admissible The proceedings were for thenational courts indirectly to its being investigated or if the State is unwilling or purpose to shield the person
Iraise their standards ~ prosecuted by a State unable genuinely to carry ~ concerned from criminal
regarding the investigation which has jurisdiction. oClc:=:::=:=::::> out the investigation or responsibility.
and prosecution of "core prosecution. 2) Art.17 (2) (b)
crimes". There has been an unjustifieddelay in the proceedings with
intention not to bring the
Art. 17 {1}{b} Art. 17 {1} (bl
person concerned to justice.
3) Art. 17(2) (c)
A case is inadmissible if it A case becomes admissible The proceedings are/were not
has been investigated by if the decision not to conducted independently or
~ a State, which has OCIc:=:::=:=::::> prosecute resulted from
~
impartially.
jurisdiction over it and has unwillingness or inability.
decided not to prosecute The standard of "inability":
the person concerned. Art. 17 (3)
A State is unable to obtain
the accused or the
Art. 17 {1Hc} Art. 17 (1Hc). 20 {3} necessary evidence and. testimony or is otherwiseA case is inadmissible if (a} {cl
the person concerned has A case becomes admissible unable to carry out its
C= already been tried for the oClc:=:::=:=::::> if the trail was for the ~ proceedings, due to a total
conduct, which is subject purpose of shielding the or substantial collapse or
of the complaint person concerned or was unavailability of its
not impartially or not
national judicial
indeoendentlv. system.
Art. 17 {1}{d}
oe:::: A case is inadmissible due to insufficient ::::>
gravity.
hiDb the Inti ti' I Criminal C d the N, .• IC
;l Jan Denecke
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III. Bringing a case to the International Criminal Court
The Security Council of State Party Third State Governmental- and
the United Nations (Non-Party State) Non-Governmental
Organisations
". ". ". ".
A situation that one or more crimes within the subject-matter jurisdiction have been committed
The Office of the Prosecutor I
". ". ". ".
Art. 13 (bl Art. 13 (al. 14 Art. 13 (cl. Art.15
The Prosecutor initiates The Prosecutor initiates The Prosecutor may initiate investigations proprio
an investigation. an investigation. motu on the basis of information on crimes within
the jurisdiction of the ICC.
The Court has The Court has
1) seriousness of the informationjurisdiction: jurisdiction: 2) authorization of the Pre-Trail Chamber
1) ratione materiae 1) ratione materiae
Based on the Based on the
Rome Statute Rome Statute ..LL(Art. 5) (Art.5)
2) ratione tempore 2) ratione tempore The Court has jurisdiction:
Based on the Based on the
Rome Statute Rome Statute 1) ratione materiae(Art. 11) (Art. 11)
3) ratione loci 3) ratione loci Based on the Rome Statute (Art. 5)
Based on the Based on the 2) ratione tempore
Charter of the Rome Statute. Based on the Rome Statute (Art. 11)
United Nations Art. 12 (2) (a) 3) ratione loci
(Chapter VII) only if the Based on the Rome Statute. Art. 12 (2) (a)
4) ratione alleged crime only if the alleged crime was committed on
personae was committed the territory of a State Party
Based on the on the territory 4) ratione personae
Charter of the of a State Party Based on the Rome Statute Art. 12 (2) (b)
United Nations 4) ratione only if the alleged crime was committed byR national of R StRtA PRrtv
(Chapter VII) personae .liBased on the
If a situation is referred Rome Statute Art. 18
to the Prosecutor by the Art. 12 (2) (b) Preliminary rulings regarding admissibility:
Security Council the only if the
acceptance of the alleged crime 1) Notification of all State parties and thoseterritorial State or State was committed
of nationality is not by a national of which normally would exercise jurisdiction2) Deferral to the State's jurisdiction ifnecessary. a State Party requested so by the StateProblem! Jurisdiction
over nationals of a Non- 3) Unless the Pre-Trail Chamber authorizes
party State: justified the commencement of the investigation
over a transfer of the 4) The decision of the Pre-Trail Chamber can
national court's be appealed to the Appeals Chamber
jurisdictional power of
State parties to the ICC
". ". ".
Art. 17. Issues of Admissibility: The case must be admissible
.&. .&. A
Art. 19. Challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of a case
©JanDenecke
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